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Aliens with Guns:
Equal Protection, Federal Power, and the
Second Amendment
PratheepanGulasekaram*

ABSTRACT: The nexus between guns and alienage presents a window
through which to assess the competing constitutionalvalues embodied in the
Equal Protection Clause, the federalforeign-affairs power, and the Second
Amendment. This Article analyzes the applicationof equal-protection norms
and the federal foreign-affairs power on federal and state statutes that
restrict the ability of non-citizens to bear arms. Professor Gulasekaram
argues that courts should evaluate alienagerestrictions at both the state and
federal level under a unified analytic framework that would attempt to
reconcile both personhood norms, such as equality, and gate-keeping norms
vindicated by reliance on federal-power doctrines. As a result, the power of
the federal government to legislate with regard to non-citizens would be
reduced while concurrently allowing greater flexibility for states and
localities.
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ALIENS WITH GUNS

INTRODUCTION

In this era of increased attention to immigration, national security, and
terrorism,1 often overlooked is a constitutional nexus where equalprotection principles, the federal foreign-affairs power, and the Second
Amendment coalesce: alienage and the right to bear arms.2 In a netherregion, hidden from mainstream national debate, lurk federal and state laws
that condition gun possession, or aspects of it, on citizenship. 3 Delving into
alienage restrictions in firearms laws exposes fundamental flaws within the
primary constitutional frameworks used to determine the rights and benefits
available to non-citizens. Just as alarming, the current judicial analysis of
these firearms laws equivocates between equal-protection and federal-power
principles, thereby rendering the constitutionality of alienage classifications
unpredictable.4 Because of the profound impact of these competing
constitutional principles on larger debates regarding the significance of
citizenship, the rights of non-citizens, the scope of federal power, and
ideological commitments to the role of the Second Amendment, this Article
proffers a reevaluation and reconciliation of these doctrines and their
underlying constitutional values.
One of the constitutional values informing this debate is the right to
bear arms-a uniquely American symbol of defiance against tyranny. The
marriage between firearms and America traces its roots to the country's
founding era; James Madison contended that "the advantage of being
armed" was a characteristic "which the Americans possess over the people of
almost every other nation."5 Since that time, gun ownership has occupied a
1. See generally, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501 (2005); Juliet Stumpf,
Citizens of an Enemy Land: Enemy Combatants, Aliens, and the Constitutional Rights of the PseudoCitizen, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79 (2004); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1575 (2002); OFFICE OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 5

(2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat-strathls.pdf ("Our great
power leaves these enemies with few conventional options for doing us harm. One such option
is to take advantage of our freedom and openness by secretly inserting terrorists into our
country to attack our homeland."); STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE
OPEN DOOR: How MILITANT ISLAMIC TERRORISTS ENTERED AND REMAINED IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1993-2001 (2002), availableat http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/theopendoor.pdf.
2. Please note that for purposes of this Article, I use the term "alien" to refer to the class
of people who are not citizens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (3) (2000). As an immigrant, a former
legal permanent resident, and now a naturalized citizen of the United States, I am well aware of
the pejorative implications of the term "alien," implications that emphasize the assumed
foreignness and difference of otherwise loyal, law-abiding, and patriotic people living in the
United States. See Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the
National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 303. I use the term in this Article because it is used
in statutory language and case law.
3. See infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 244 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
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distinct position in the American popular, political, and legal landscape.6
For almost a century and a half, however, so central an American trait has
provoked dispute over7 who is sufficiently constituted-that is, sufficiently

American-to wield it.

Even while this tension persists, non-citizens throughout American
history have wielded arms in U.S. military campaigns and have made the
ultimate sacrifice that even the most patriotic citizens are sometimes
reluctant to make: giving one's life for the nation. s Despite this record of
national defense, the right of aliens to bear arms domestically is a murky
matter.9 Currently, those same non-citizens who could be drafted to die for

6. See, e.g., Joseph Bruce Alonso, International Law and the United States Constitution in
Conflict: A Case Study on the Second Amendment, 26 HOUS.J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2003) (arguing that the
right to bear arms is uniquely significant in American culture); Robert Weisberg, Values,
Violence, and the Second Amendment: American Character, Constitutionalism,and Crime, 39 HOUS. L.
REV. 1, 9 (2002) (discussing claims of American "exceptionalism" regarding violence and gun
ownership).
7. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857) (warning that
recognizing "persons of the negro race" as citizens would give them the right "to keep and carry
arms wherever they went"); CLAYrON E. CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE
STATE: THE ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR
ARMS 164 (1994) (noting that the increase in laws aimed at firearm possession after 1890

coincided with the increase of labor unions, substantial immigration, and increased nativism).
8. Despite the nation's genocidal colonization of their ancestors' lands, Native Americans
have borne arms in defense of U.S. interests throughout American history. See TOM HOLM,
STRONG HEARTS, WOUNDED SOULS: NATIVE AMERICAN VETERANS OF THE VIETNAM WAR (1996);
see also U.S. DEPT. OF THE NAVY, NAVY HISTORICAL CENTER, 20TH CENTURY WARRIORS: NATIVE
AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE U.S. MILITARY, available at http://www.history.navy.mil/
faqs/faq6l-1.htm. Many interned, second-generation Japanese Americans, inducted while
confined in camps, served in the U.S. military to prove their loyalty and patriotism. See ERIC
MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR THEIR COUNTRY: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN DRAFT
RESISTERS IN WORLD ATAR II passim (2003).
Currently federal law requires non-citizen male inhabitants of the United States to
register for selective service, and these people can then be conscripted into military service in
the event of a draft. See Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (2000) ("[I]t shall be
the duty of every male citizen of the United States, and every other male person residing in the United
States ... between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to
registration ... ." (emphasis added)); see also Charles E. Roh, Jr. & Frank I. Upham, The Status
of Aliens Under United States Draft Laws, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501, 501-02 (1972).
At the present time, approximately 70,000 foreign-born persons serve in the U.S.
military, of which roughly 35,000 are non-citizens. See Anita U. Hattiangadi et al., Non-Citizens
in
Today's Military
(Apr. 2005),
available at http://www.cna.org/news/releases/
researchbriefs.aspx; LAURA BARKER &JEANNE BATALOVA, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE FOREIGN
BORN IN THE ARMED SERVICES (2007), available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/
USfocus/display.cfm ?id=572.

Over 140 non-citizens serving in the U.S. military have died already in the War on
Terror. See Associated Press, "Gold Star" Moms to Admit Non-Citizens, June 28, 2005, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8387014/.

9.

Don B. Kates, Jr., Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the United States, in

RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT 15-20 (Don B. Kates ed., 1979)
[hereinafter RESTRICTING HANDGUNS]; John R. Salter, Jr. & Don B. Kates, Jr., The Necessity of
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the nation on the battlefield can be prohibited from serving on state or local
police forces.'0 Further, over twenty states have some form of restriction on
firearm possession by non-citizens, generally falling into one of four
categories: (1) (1)
denial of non-citizen possession;" (2) denial of non-citizen
concealed carrying; 12 (3) heightened restrictions on non-citizen possession
(either general or concealed carrying);13 or (4) particularized restrictions on
non-citizen possession, transport, or use. '4 Federal criminal statutes
currently forbid ownership, possession, or transport of firearms by non-

Access to Firearmsby Dissenters and Minorities whom Government Is Unwilling or Unable to Protect, in
RESTRICTING HANDGUNS, supra, at 185-91.

10. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 299-300 (1978) (upholding a New York law that
prohibited aliens from serving as state troopers).
11. Three states-Hawaii, Indiana, and New York-have enacted flat bans on non-citizen
possession of firearms, although each provides exceptions. HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-2(d) (1993 &
Supp. 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-2-3(e) (4) (West Supp. 2006); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01(5)
(McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2007). Two other states-Minnesota and Virginia-absolutely bar
non-immigrant aliens from gun possession (although they apparently allow possession by lawful
permanent residents). See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.719 (West 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2308.2:01 (2004). One state-Louisiana-prohibits possession by "enemy aliens," a malleable
term that could cause significant confusion during the non-sovereignty directed "War on
Terror." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95(A) (2) (2004).
12. Of the twenty-plus states that restrict alien gun possession, more fall into the second
general category than any other. Seven states-Arkansas, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Oregon, and South Dakota-deny non-citizens the ability to obtain a concealed
weapons permit or license. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-309(a)(1)(A)(i) (2005); MO. REV. STAT. §
571.090(1)(1) (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-321(1) (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-19-4
(A)(1) (2004 & Supp. 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.12(a)(1) (2005); OR. REV. STAT. §
166.291 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS § 23-7-7.1.1(8) (2006). Oregon allows non-citizens to
acquire permits if they declare their intent to naturalize. OR. REV. STAT. § 166.291. Two more
states-Arizona and Florida-deny concealed-weapons permits to out-of-state aliens, although
they presumably do not restrict the ability of in-state aliens to apply for them. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3112(E)(1) (2001 & Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT. § 790.06 (2006).
13. The third general category of state statutory restrictions includes states that impose
heightened and more rigorous requirements on aliens to obtain firearm permits. Two statesMassachusetts and Washington-have bifurcated statutory schemes for gun possession that
require aliens to apply for special permits that may be limited in duration and require extensive
background appraisals, including references from the consul of the non-citizen's country of
national origin or references from U.S. citizens familiar with the non-citizen. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 140, § 131F (2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.170 (West 2006).
14. The fourth and final general category of state restrictions is a catch-all for the
remaining particularized, and sometimes odd, set of alienage distinctions in gun laws apparent
in the laws of at least four states. Illinois bans non-immigrant aliens from gun possession unless
the non-immigrant is using the gun for hunting purposes or is the representative of a foreign
government. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/4(a) (2) (xi) (2004). Kentucky allows any person to
apply for a gun license, but certified gun instructors who teach courses necessary for a gun
license must be U.S. citizens. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.110(2) (West 2006). California's gun
licensing laws do not differentiate based on alienage, but aliens cannot transport a firearm in a
car, a right that citizens maintain. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12025 (West 2000). North Dakota law
prohibits discharge of a firearm within city limits unless that discharge is by a citizen in defense
of property. N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-06 (2003).
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immigrant aliens, undocumented aliens, and former citizens who have
renounced their citizenship.15
Purporting to survey the field, one legal encyclopedia flatly concludes,
"noncitizens do not have the right to bear arms under either the Federal
Constitution or most state constitutions." 6 Despite this pronouncement, no
federal court has actually come to this conclusion, because no such court
has addressed the question.1 7 The handful of state courts that have
considered the issue have not produced consensus. 8
While some state courts view the question as an equal-protection
problem, others view it as a federal-powers question.' 9 Thus, these two
contemporary constitutional doctrines, chiefly developed in the latter half of
the twentieth century, have been the analytic tools used to assess, and
sometimes shield, these laws-many of which are the animus-based
expressions of an earlier historical period. 21 As a general matter, those
courts focusing on equal-protection norms have struck down state
restrictions, whereas those focusing on federal preemption and Tenth

15.

18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000).

16. 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 7 (2005).
17. In what appears to be the closest recent brush that the issue has had with a federal
court, the Ninth Circuit decided that a conviction under the state of Washington's alien-inpossession law did not constitute an "aggravated felony" for federal sentencing purposes.
United States v. Sandoval-Barajas, 206 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2000). The constitutionality of the
state conviction was not at issue, and the court made no mention of the statute's validity vel non.
In 1914, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a now-repealed Pennsylvania statute that prohibited
non-citizens' killing of wild game except for self-defense and non-citizen possession of shotguns
and rifles. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1914).
18. See infra notes 19-20.
19. Compare Chan v. City of Troy, 559 N.W.2d 374 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (striking down
Michigan's alienage distinction in firearms law as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the U.S. Constitution), with Washington v. Hernandez-Mercado, 124 Wash. 2d 368, 373, 375-76
(Wash. 1994) (upholding Washington's alienage distinction in firearms law against both
preemption and equal-protection challenges), and Utah v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d 677, 679-680 (Utah
1982) (upholding Utah's ban on alien gun possession against federal and state constitutional
guarantees of the right-to-bear-arms and federal preemption challenges).
Equal-protection analysis ensures a fit between the state's justifications for use of a
classification in its laws and the state's means for achieving those justifications. See generally
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §§ 9.1-9.7 (2d ed. 2002).

The level of judicial scrutiny under such analysis is divided into three tiers--strict scrutiny for
suspect classifications, intermediate scrutiny for quasi-suspect classifications, and rational-basis
scrutiny for non-suspect classifications. Id.
Federal-power analysis may be either federal preemption analysis or federal plenarypower analysis. See generally id. §§ 3.5, 4.6, 5.2. Under either analysis, state laws conflicting with
federal laws or entrenching upon exclusive domains of federal power are invalidated. Id.
20. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 787, 805-07
(1994) (stating that the Supreme Court did not clearly recognize federal preemption until the
beginning of the twentieth century and that modern preemption doctrine developed only after
the New Deal).
21. See supranote 9.
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Amendment principles have upheld the restrictions.22 While a law, such as
an alien-in-possession statute, might simultaneously implicate both of these
doctrines, courts have intriguingly chosen one or the other as their principal
analytic tool when assessing the constitutionality of alienage restrictions."
In light of this framework, my contribution connects the rich
scholarship developed around the three constitutional values at stake,
namely, the right to bear arms, alienage and citizenship, and federal foreign
24
affairs and immigration. This Article engages these values by critiquing the
judicial metrics used to determine the appropriate level of governmental
protections and benefits for non-citizens who live in and contribute to the
nation. I demonstrate that these judicial metrics depend on categorical
analyses that do not accurately account for the underlying empirics of
alienage, state and federal competencies, or, for purposes of my study, gun
possession in America. Even more profound than this administrability or
categorical-fit problem, our current judicial methodology vis-a-vis noncitizens demonstrates America's profound schizophrenia on the subject. On
the one hand, courts applying personhood principles, such as equal
protection, to alienage questions support notions of America as a land of
immigrants, America where acculturation is a laudable goal, and America
where adequate opportunity translates into the ability to earn, participate,
and contribute. On the other hand, courts applying federal-power
principles, which emphasize uniformity and gate-keeping, focus on the
necessity of maintaining a politically viable community of Americans, of
preserving the primacy of national-security concerns, and of resisting foreign
influences in American politics. This Article argues that our current judicial
metrics fail to account for these divergent constitutional values in a cohesive
and integrated fashion. It further argues that this failure mandates a
different methodology for resolving questions of non-citizens' inclusion
within the polity-one that accounts for both personhood norms and gatekeeping necessities. This new understanding will necessarily alter the power
dynamic between federal and state authorities with regard to alienage.

22.

See supra note 19.

23. See infra Part III.
24. See sources cited supra note 1 (listing citizenship and immigration literature); see also T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizenship Talk: A Revisionist Narrative,69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1689, 1690-91
(2001); Linda Bosniak, A Basic TerritorialDistinction, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 407-08 (2002);
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Exceptionalism: Commentary on Is There a Plenary Power
Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 307, 307-08 (2000); Hiroshi Motomura, ImmigrationLaw After a
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J.
545, 580-83 (1990). For literature on the right to bear arms, see generally, for example,
Sanford M. Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1990); Eugene
Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 793 (1998); David C. Williams,
Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551
(1993).
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Specifically, this Article is based on the fundamental claim that outside
the context of the federal government's power over admission of aliens,
neither level of government has special or unique authority to act with
regard to non-citizens.O Therefore, I argue, alienage restrictions at both the
federal and state level should be evaluated by courts using tools similar to
the ones prescribed by the Constitution for other classifications involving
groups of persons or assertions of individual rights. 26 My critique of alien
gun laws, which challenges courts' current "immigration exceptionalism,"27
results in four core claims. First, when state and local authorities create
classifications on the basis of U.S. citizenship, courts should apply federal
preemption analyses only in the specific and limited circumstances of an
actual conflict with positive federal law. Second, when either state/local or
federal authorities create alienage restrictions, courts should evaluate such
laws under the constitutional rubric designed to evaluate governmental
classifications of persons or groups of persons-that is, under the equalprotection standard. Third, under a general equal-protection rubric that
requires statutes to have a factual basis and an adequate fit between asserted
goals and means, both federal and state authorities should be allowed to
assert national-security or gate-keeping goals as justifications for their lawmaking. Fourth and finally, for all levels of government, courts should assess
the alienage restriction in the same manner and avoid giving broad
deference to federal law-making on the one hand, and special exceptions to
state law-making on the other.
I defend these claims by first critiquing the political-function exception
that courts have created to evaluate state alienage restrictions under general
equal-protection analysis. Having argued that the alienage context should
not alter equal-protection methodology at the state level in any fundamental
manner, I then argue that there is little justification for thinking of alienage
questions as federal-power problems, either under positive federal firearms
law, federal immigration law, or a presumed federal exclusivity over alienage
even in the absence of positive law. Finally, I defend the idea that all laws
with alienage classifications, at either the state or federal level, should be

25. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM.J. INT'L
L. 862, 864, 869-71 (1989) (describing the courts' very limited role with regard to immigration
and arguing that instead of broad plenary power, "courts ought to examine the justifications
offered on behalf of federal regulations based on alienage to see if they meet traditional
constitutional standards of permissibility"); Stephen H. Legomsky, Fearand Loathing in Congress
and the Courts: Immigration andJudicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1615, 1616-19 (2000) (discussing
existence of and factors causing "immigration exceptionalism"); Frank H. Wu, The Limits of
Borders: A Moderate Proposalfor Immigration Reform, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 35, 42-43 (1996)
(arguing that immigration law at the federal level "lacks guiding principles").
26. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, §§ 9.1-9.7 & 10.1-10.10 (discussing judicial
methodology for equal-protection claims and fundamental rights under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses).
27. See supra note 25.

HeinOnline -- 92 Iowa L. Rev. 898 2006-2007

ALIENS WITH GUNS

evaluated under the same rubric that would allow all levels of government to
assert security or gate-keeping rationales. This progression leads to a unitary
analysis that incorporates the divergent values underlying the equalprotection and federal-power doctrines and alters the dynamic between
federal and state governments when determining the rights of non-citizens.
Having clarified what this Article will do, let me also clarify what it will
not do. First, although many of these laws were passed at the turn of the
twentieth century, during moments of heightened xenophobia and racism
in the nation's evolution, I do not explore the impact of this history on the
viability of alien gun laws.28 Second, I do not intend to enter the individualversus collective-right debate that has dominated Second Amendment
scholarship. 29 At times this Article assumes, without advocating, an
individual right of possession for purposes of exploring the potential equalprotection analyses. Finally, I note that citizenship and immigration
processes are hotly debated topics in legal scholarship. Although this
Article has implications for both the collective-rights and immigrationcontrol debates, it will not focus on those potential consequences. Further, I
use citizenship only in the statutory sense-the fact of being born in the
United States or having been naturalized in accordance with the
Immigration and Nationality Act. 31 Unless otherwise specified, references to
"non-citizens," "aliens," or "alien gun laws" refer to restrictions on legal
permanent residents ("LPRs") or nonimmigrant aliens: 32 While I ultimately
28. Cf Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 225-33 (1985) (declaring an Alabama
constitutional provision disenfranchising felons unconstitutional because the provision's
original enactment was motivated by racial animus);Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214,
1223-27 (lth Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 650 (2005) (declaring a reenacted Florida
constitutional provision disenfranchising felons constitutional because the taint of racially
motivated original enactment had been removed).
29. See supra note 24; see also Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?,
76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 291,293-95 (2001).
30. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 334, 340-41, 349-50 (2005)
(emphasizing the potential robustness of the citizen/non-citizen divide, especially after passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78
N.Y.U. L. REv. 667, 690-91 (2003) (arguing that citizenship during the colonial and founding
era was an unsettled concept that may have had little to do with the Framers' intent when
deciding to whom the benefits of the Constitution would inure).
31.
I use the term "alien" to refer to the class of people who are not citizens. See 8 U.S.C. §
1101 (a) (3) (2000); see also supranote 2.
32. 1 recognize that "non-citizen" or "alien" could refer to at least three statutory subdivisions: (1) Legal permanent residents ("LPRs") (or immigrant aliens or resident aliens); (2)
nonimmigrant aliens (or temporary immigrants); and (3) undocumented aliens (or so-called
illegal aliens). State laws discriminating against LPRs and nonimmigrant aliens in other areas of
regulation have been those subject to rigorous constitutional scrutiny. See Toll v. Moreno, 458
U.S. 1, 10-11, 17 (1982) (invalidating state law denying tuition benefits to nonimmigrant
aliens); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72, 376-80 (1971) (invalidating state law
denying welfare benefits to resident aliens). In most jurisdictions limiting LPR or
nonimmigrant-alien gun possession, undocumented aliens are similarly, if not more, restricted.

HeinOnline -- 92 Iowa L. Rev. 899 2006-2007

92 IOWA LAWREVIEW

[2007]

believe that most alienage restrictions in gun laws are unconstitutional,
based on the xenophobic history of alien gun laws or the proper application
of the framework I propose, this Article focuses on the constitutional values
informing this result, rather than the result itself.
Part I of this Article focuses on the courts' use of equal protection to
test alien gun laws. It argues that examination of alien gun laws
demonstrates that state alienage restrictions should not be understood
differently than other types of state laws singling out classes of persons,
specifically undermining the viability of the political-function exception in
state alienage jurisprudence. Part II addresses the competing positions
courts consider when alien gun laws are evaluated under federal foreignaffairs powers. Its major focus is on the illegitimacy of according near carteblanche deference to the federal government by undermining the viability
of the distinction between foreign and local affairs and mining the Second
Amendment's structural-power implications. Part III exposes the problems
with attempting to select between equal-personhood norms and federalpower analyses, and it suggests that in the absence of justifiable federal
exclusivity in the area of alienage restrictions, the Constitution's other
provisions for understanding the rights of individuals and classes of
individuals should control. The Article concludes by suggesting how courts
might integrate equal-protection and federal-power principles to determine
rights and benefits for non-citizens on normatively more defensible grounds
that require reconceiving the interaction of federal and state authority.
I.

EQUAL-PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO ALIENAGE DISTINCTIONS
IN GUN LAWS

When state courts have struck down alienage restrictions in state
firearms statutes, they have done so on equal-protection grounds using strict
scrutiny. 33 Here, I explore equal-protection positions for and against the
constitutionality of state alien gun laws, critiquing the current judicial
methodology for demarcating areas of narrow and broad deference to
governmental regulation. In equal-protection analysis, these positions can be
organized along three related debates: (1) whether the right to bear arms is
a political right or function; (2) whether the right to bear arms is a
See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-3112 (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7583.23 (West
2006); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/4 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-404 (2006); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.

§ 6109 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1-47-7 (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503 (2006); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-308.2:01 (2006).
33. See supra note 19. I focus only on state alien gun laws here because equal-protection
norms have carried greater valence with state alienage distinctions than with federal ones.
Compare Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (upholding citizenship requirement for federal
welfare benefits as an exercise of federal foreign-affairs authority), with Graham, 403 U.S. at 37071, 376-78 (striking down citizenship requirements for state welfare benefits as a violation of
both equal protection and federal supremacy). I will return to federal alien gun laws and their
viability under equal-protection analysis in Part III.
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fundamental right of vulnerable minority groups; and (3) whether the right
to bear arms is an individual right.
A.

THE RIGHT To BEAR ARMS AS A POITICAL RIGHT OR FUNCTION

Although non-citizens are covered by equal-protection guarantees,, 4 the
precise extent of that coverage has vacillated throughout the last century. 5
While courts sometimes treat non-citizens as a suspect class, deserving of the
most stringent scrutiny, at other times they view non-citizens as undeserving
of this label, and thus accord them little constitutional protection. One
reason for this inconsistency is that in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the seminal case
establishing that alien residents are protected by the Equal Protection
Clause, the Court's underlying concern was racial animus, not alienage per
se.3 6 When a legislature uses alienage as a proxy for race, laws surely deserve
the most stringent scrutiny: Since Yick Wo, however, the Court has held that
alienage itself is a suspect classification in the hands of the states, even when
it does not overtly operate as a proxy for race. 3 This development conflicts
with the fact that alienage is a necessary classification for entry, exit, and
naturalization to the country. The Constitution itself
uses an alienage
39
distinction, prohibiting aliens from elected positions.
Modern alienage jurisprudence generally treats aliens as a suspect class
requiring strict constitutional scrutiny, under which the classification fails.
34. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-70 (1886); see also Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1896) (stating that non-citizens are covered by the Due Process
Clause and must be accorded Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights).
35. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75, 80-81 (1979) (sustaining a New York law
barring aliens from teaching in public schools tinder the "political function exception");
Graham, 403 U.S. at 370-71, 376-78 (striking down state welfare laws conditioning benefits on
citizenship); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 421-22 (1948) (striking down a
California law denying aliens fishing licenses and signaling demise of the "special public
interest exception" doctrine); Ohio ex. rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 396 (1927)
(sustaining law barring aliens from operation of billiard halls under the "special public interest
exception" to equal-protection law); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 38-42 (1915) (striking down
an Arizona law requiring eighty percent of employed persons in business to be natural-born
citizens as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because it unequally regulated the right to
work, which is part of personal freedom that is the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1914) (sustaining a law barring aliens from
hunting wild game).
36. It was the fact that the law operated to disadvantage laundry owners of Chinese
descent that mattered, not that it discriminated against non-citizens. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 36970, 374.
37. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231 (1985) (holding that an Alabama
constitutional provision disenfranchising felons was motivated by the desire to disenfranchise
African Americans).
38. See, e.g., Graham, 403 U.S. at 371-72 (striking down state welfare laws with alienage
distinction); Takahashi,334 U.S. at 418.
39. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2-3 (mandating that citizenship is required for U.S.
Representatives and Senators); id. art. II, § 1 (mandating that natural-born citizenship is
required for Presidency).
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But the political-function exception to the general rule sometimes ratchets
down the level of scrutiny to rationality review. 40 Under the political-function
exception, alienage distinctions in activities that are "so closely bound up
with the formulation and implementation of self-government, " 41 or tied to a
state's ability to define its political community,42 will survive constitutional
scrutiny. Courts using this exception have upheld state restrictions on noncitizens serving as police officers, 43 teaching in public schools, 44 working as
.
46
.
probation officers, 45 and sitting onjunes.
Does the right to bear arms belong under the political-function
exception? State courts that have struck down alienage restrictions in state
gun laws have answered this question in the negative. 47 These state-court
pronouncements, however, have failed to grapple with the profound
implications of their positions. In developing a nuanced answer to the
political-function question, I conclude that persuasive reasons exist to
consider arms-bearing a political right amenable to alienage restrictions.
Accepting that conclusion, however, requires re-envisioning the obligations
of citizenship and the existence of the political-function exception.
This Section examines the political nature of the right to bear arms,
first from a historical perspective and then by comparison to other activities
deemed political by the courts. In both inquiries, I wrestle with the same
question of how to square conceptions of "political" rights and inclusion in

40. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642-43, 646-48 (1973) (striking down a New York
law barring aliens from competitive civil-service positions, but speculating that states retain the
power to create alienage distinctions for voters, elective office, important non-elective offices,
and public-policy decision-makers); see also Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (striking
down a state law excluding aliens from higher-education financial aid); Examining Bd. of
Eng'rs, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601-06 (1976) (striking down
a Puerto Rico statute banning aliens from engineering practice); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717,
721-23 (1973) (striking down a state law barring aliens from being licensed as attorneys) .
41.
Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 221-28 (1984) (illustrating the political-function
doctrine and striking down a Texas law barring aliens from becoming notary publics).
42. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978).
43. Id. at 299-300.
44. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75-81(1979).
45. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 441-46 (1982).
46. Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 138-39 (D. Md. 1974), affd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
47. The Michigan Court of Appeals found in Chan v. City of Troy that alien gun possession
did not affect the state's ability to define its political community and therefore did not fall into
the political-function exception. 559 N.W.2d 374, 379 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). The court then
found that denying permanent residents gun-possession rights was not sufficiently tailored to
the goal of public safety, and it struck down the law. Id. at 380. The Nevada Supreme Court, in
State v. Chumphol, followed a similar path, concluding that the state's denial of concealedweapons licenses to aliens was unconstitutional under strict scrutiny. 634 P.2d 451, 451-52
(Nev. 1981). Like Chan, the court found the state's alien gun restriction unrelated to a
fundamental government activity. Id California courts have reached the same conclusion.
People v. Rappard, 28 Cal. App. 3d 302, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (declaring the state's ban on
alien concealed-weapon possession unconstitutional as violation of state and federal equalprotection principles).
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the political community with underlying commitments to equality. The
stakes of this categorization are high; defined as a political right, gun
possession welcomes alienage distinctions, but defined as non-political, it
cannot.
1. The Historical (D)evolution of a Political Right
Although it does not appear likely that scholars or courts will ever agree
on the Second Amendment's purpose, either now or at the time of its
origin, 48 many do agree that, at least during the founding era, bearing arms
was a political right. 49 As Professor Akhil Amar powerfully argues, the
Founders drafted the Second Amendment to address the core concerns of
populism and federalism, not individual liberty. 50 Further, he notes that, in
the divide between political rights and more general civil rights guaranteed
by state governments, bearing arms fell on the political side of the divide:
Alien men and single white women circa 1800 typically could
speak, print, worship, [etc.] . . . , but typically could not vote, hold
public office, or serve on juries. These last three were political
rights, reserved for First-Class Citizens. So too, the right to bear
arms had long been viewed as a political right, a right of First-Class
Citizens.5'
Arms-bearing was essential to a state's political self-definition because it was
critical to the state's ability to assert its sovereignty and independence
against a potentially tyrannous central government with a standing army.52
The connection Amar draws between voting and arms-bearing is
particularly instructive for evaluating the constitutionality of alienage
restrictions in gun law. 53 Laws sometimes causally linked voting and gun

48. See, e~g.,United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 218-21 (5th Cir. 2001) (presenting, in
dicta, historical evidence that the Second Amendment protected an individual's right to bear
arms); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 265-66 (1998)
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment strengthened the individual-rights reading of the
Second Amendment). But see David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and
Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 589-92 (2000) (disputing Akhil Amar's view of the
impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on the Second Amendment).
49.

See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 48, at 46-53.

50.
Id. at 46. But see David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998
BYU L. REV. 1359, 1446 (disagreeing with Amar's historical account).
51.
AMAR, supra note 48, at 48. But note that Amar, in Part II of his book
("Reconstruction") argues that the Fourteenth Amendment altered this balance between civil
and political rights and converted the right to bear arms into a civil right exercisable by all
citizens. Id. at 217-23.
52.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), supranote 5, at 295-97.
53.
AMAR, supra note 48, at 258 ("At the Founding, the right of the people to keep and
bear arms stood shoulder to shoulder with the right to vote; arms bearing in militias embodied
a paradigmatic politicalright flanking the other main political rights of voting, office holding,
and jury service.").
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rights, whereas voting was only tenuously correlated with citizenship. In
postbellum Arkansas, for example, anti-dueling laws punished improper use
of guns by depriving the offender of the rights to vote and hold office.54
However, state governments did not restrict voting to citizens either at the
founding or throughout the nineteenth century.5 5 Aliens were allowed
suffrage in twenty-two states and territories during most of the 1800s, and
aliens remained a part of the electorate in some states well into the twentieth
century. 56 This divergence between voting and citizenship suggests that

alien-voting bans,
although constitutionally
permitted, are
not
constitutionally mandated.5 7 When gun laws maintain these close
connections with suffrage, alienage restrictions in firearms laws operate
similarly to those in voting: they are not constitutionally mandated, but they
are permitted.
The post-Reconstruction experience of African American citizens
solidified the relationship between guns and voting, but for reasons vastly
different than the pre-Reconstruction conception of gun rights and voting as
privileges reserved for first-class citizens. Post-Reconstruction, guns were
used to ensure the newly minted and inclusive parameters of citizenship. 5
Recently freed African Americans and abolitionists championed the right to
bear arms as a necessary measure against the violence of former slave
masters, the Ku Klux Klan, state-militia members, and others hostile to their
freedom. 59 Although in 1870, the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment
guaranteed blacks voting rights in theory, private violence and state
indifference kept blacks from political participation in practice. 60 Gun use by
African Americans during that era became necessary to ensure the
guarantees of the Reconstruction amendments. 6' Accordingly, Professors
Robert Cottrol and Raymond Diamond conclude that the "history of the

54. See RobertJ. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, "Never Intended to be Applied to the White
Population" Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity-The Redeemed South's Legacy to a National
Jurisprudence, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1307, 1327 (1995) (describing features of the Arkansas
Constitution of 1864).
55. Leon E. Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 114, 114-16
(1931); Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutionaland Theoretical
Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1397-1417 (1993).
56. Aylsworth, supra note 55, at 114.
57. But see Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1109 (1977) (arguing that if a state offers anyone within its jurisdiction the

right to vote, it cannot deny it to any person, citizen or alien, unless the restriction passes strict
scrutiny).
58. See infra notes 59-66.

59.

AMAR, supranote 48, at 258-59; Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 54, at 1333.

60. Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an AfroAmericanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 349 & n.197 (1991) (citing GEORGE C. RABLE, BUT
THERE WAASNo PEACE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION (1984)).

61.

See id.; see also Stefan B. Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2 GEO. MASON U. CIV.

RTS. L.J. 67, 68-77 (1991).
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right to bear arms is, thus, inextricably linked with the efforts to reconstruct
the nation and bring about a new racial order."6 2 This narrative suggests that
bearing arms was, like jury service and voting, a critical right for use as a
check against the power of the state in Jim Crow America. Although not a
political right for defense of state sovereignty as an organized state militia,
the right to bear arms was critical in a core political sense as a guarantor of
the right of voting.
Some have argued that firearms were essential to vindicating voting and
assembly rights for African Americans beyond Reconstruction and well into
the twentieth century. 63 Professor Don Kates explains that in the 1960s,
firearm possession was "almost universally endorsed by the black
community, for it could not depend on police protection from the KKK" c4
Gun possession by civil-rights activists was critical to the ability of Southern
African Americans and civil-rights workers to exercise their rights of
assembly and petition.65 Perhaps more importantly, firearm possession by
Southern African Americans appeared to increase governmental
accountability to its minority citizens: "Moreover, civil rights workers' access
to firearms for self-defense often caused Southern police to preserve the
peace as66 they would not have done if only the Ku Kluxers had been
armed."

Thus, through specific periods of the nation's evolution, the right to
bear arms was considered or used as a political right, which under modern
alienage jurisprudence would allow for citizenship distinctions similar to
those that developed in voting, office-holding, and jury-service rules. Once
divorced from its political roots, however, the right to bear arms should no
longer be restricted in the same manner as voting, office holding, and jury
service because the right no longer belongs to the political community.
Therefore, the more pressing question is whether intervening historical
factors have sufficiently decoupled the right to bear arms from its political
foundation so that it is no longer a politically useful instrumentality for
defense of state sovereignty or for protection from state action or
indifference.
In answering this question, Amar's theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment's catalytic power over the Bill of Rights deserves some
attention. 67 He posits that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment transformed the purely political right to bear arms,
exercisable only by first-class citizens, into a civil right, exercisable by a larger
62.
63.
64.

Cottrol & Diamond, supranote 60, at 343.
See generally Salter & Kates, supra note 9, at 185-91.
Id. at 186.

65.

Id. at 188 ("It was only because black neighborhoods were full of people who had guns

and could fight back that the Klan didn't shoot up civil rights meetings...

66.

Id.

67.

AMAR,

supra note 48, at 258-67.
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group. Notably, however, his conception of a larger group would still restrict
gun ownership to the political community and would not include aliens. By
locating transformative power in the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 68 the consequence of Amar's analysis is that the
right to bear arms is at once non-political and individual but still limited
only to citizens. 69 Reinvigoration of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, as
Amar advocates, justifies a hard division between citizens and aliens for
provision of rights with only minimal safeguards for aliens-a result that
would essentially eviscerate Yick Wo and its progeny.70
The difficulty with this reading is that it would allow for alienage
distinctions in laws touching on the most fundamental of constitutional
rights secured by Article IV and the Bill of Rights (because those rights only
inure to citizens), but would strike down alienage distinctions in laws
providing less fundamental, voluntary state benefits (because those benefits
inure to all persons). However, if the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses only minimally protect aliens with regard to non-fundamental state
beneficence, then federal and state governments should only be able to
impose minimally upon or obligate aliens. The fact that aliens once voted,
currently pay taxes, are subject to the same criminal enforcement and
punishment as citizens, and can be drafted or enlist into military service
practically undermines Amar's plausible re-envisioning of the Fourteenth
Amendment's clauses. 7' This disparity between substantial obligations
imposed on aliens, on the one hand, and theories of minimal governmental
guarantees to them, on the other,72 would require wholesale rethinking of
government burdens and benefits if rights could be simultaneously nonpolitical and available only to citizens.

68.

The Constitution provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). I am not suggesting that Amar would be
troubled by this outcome.
69. AMAR, supra note 48, at 218-23, 257-68.
70. See Epstein, supranote 30, at 342-50.
71. Of course, the Court's suffocation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the
Slaughter-House Cases effectively moots the doctrinal consequences of heavy reliance on the
citizen/person divide in the Fourteenth Amendment. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 6061, 72-80 (1872) (rejecting a privileges or immunities challenge to a statutory monopoly
granted to a specific company); see Epstein, supra note 30, at 336-40.
72. Stephen H. Legomsky, Why Citizenship?, 35 VA.J. INT'L L. 279, 293-94 (1994) ("Even in
our regime of relatively devalued citizenship, citizens enjoy many more important rights than
resident aliens do, yet citizens have very few legal obligations that resident aliens do not also
have." (internal citations omitted)).
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Leaving aside the possibility that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
devolved the right to bear arms into a non-political ight, other independent
reasons exist for believing the right to bear arms has drifted from its political
moorings. Undoubtedly, the United States, vis-a-vis foreign powers or vis-a-vis
the individual states, is not the same today as it was in 1791. Although "the
people" who were voters, jury members, public office holders, and ratifiers
of the Constitution might have been the same "people" who would
constitute a state "militia" in 1791, 71 the modern-day militia equivalent-the
National Guard and federal military forces-are not restricted to white male
citizens.74 Women, minorities, and the poor constitute a significant portion
of the Armed Forces.75 Non-citizens constitute a non-negligible segment of
the military, and non-citizen men must register for selective service.76 Thus,
the right to bear arms, at least in militia or military service, is no longer
restricted to a select group of first-class citizens.
Second, the Fourteenth Amendment's realignment of federal and state
powers reflects a shift to a greater suspicion of state powers and the primacy
of national citizenship.7 7 Unlike the Founders, who were wary of a federal
standing army and federal encroachment on liberty,78 the Reconstruction
Congress showed concern for state intrusions on liberties and the use of
armed state citizenry as elements of state oppression. 79 By the early 1900s,
state militias, once the critical bulwark against the potential tyranny of the
central government, became, in part, creatures of the federal government
with the creation of the National Guard system.80 The rise of the standing
federal army and the military-industrial complex has largely mooted both

73. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271, 271 (mandating that "all White-male
citizens" were part of the militia).
74. 10 U.S.C § 311(a) (2000) (determining the U.S. militia composition to be all male
citizens and males who have declared intent to be citizens, as well as female citizens who are
members of the National Guard).
75. David R. Segal & Mady W. Segal, America's MilitaryPopulation,59(4) POPULATION BULL.
9, 18-20, 24-30 (2004); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., POPULATION REPRESENTATION IN THE MILITARY
at
available
(2004),
SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE
2002
YEAR
FISCAL
SERVICES,

http://www.dod.mil/prhome/poprep2002/summary/summary.htm.
76. See supra note 8.
77. See Arver v. United States (Selective Draft Law Cases), 245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918)
(upholding conscription orders against Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges);
Yassky, supra note 48, at 594, 629-31 (detailing the Fourteenth Amendment's effect on federalstate dynamics and the evisceration of the Second Amendment).
78. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I-X; THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), supra
note 5.
79. Cf U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
80. 10 U.S.C. § 101 (c) (2000); see also Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 336-37, 34243, 350-54 (1990) (upholding the federal government's deployment of the Minnesota National
Guard to Central America for training purposes).
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the "calling forth" provisions of the Constitution and the need for separate
state militias."'
Finally, the rights-vindicating and anti-state functions served by African
American firearm possession no longer neatly apply today. Although
firearms played an important role in ensuring assembly, association,
petition, court-access, and voting rights for African Americans through the
civil-rights era of the 1960s, subsequent legislative developments, the
expansion of the federal commerce power to enact civil-rights laws, and the
new limitations on sovereign immunity against civil-rights actions have
helped decrease reliance on violence or the threat of violence as a primary
method of rights vindication. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, along with
greater media exposure, mobility, and information exchange, has largely
mooted the role of guns as the guarantors of political rights."'
These changes (and a few others, including firearm affordability)
appear to have transformed the right to bear arms from a political rightassociated with voting, jury service, and holding office-into a non-political
right. A practical accounting of obligations imposed by the government on
non-citizens suggests that a non-political right must inure to all persons.
Under modern alienage jurisprudence, separation of the right to possess a
firearm from its political roots allows for heightened review of gun laws
under which states would likely fail to show, under strict scrutiny, that the
classifications are narrowly tailored to achieve public safety.83
Even ignoring the historical devolution of the political nature of the
right to bear arms and instead focusing on the specific history of many alien
gun laws, courts would still be compelled to invalidate these laws-but for
completely different reasons. Most alien gun restrictions were passed during
an era of irrational fear and prejudice against immigrants, especially recently
arrived Italians.84 State legislatures enacted these types of gun laws within the

81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 15; President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address to the
Nation (Jan. 17, 1961).
82. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2000); CIVIL RIGHTS Div., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, THE EFFECT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
crt/voting/intro/intro c.htm (noting exponential increase in voter registration among African
Americans from 1965 to 1988). I make no claim that minorities have adequate political voice or
that voting is free from de facto and de jure discrimination. See, e.g.,
NAT'L COMM'N ON THE
VOTING
RIGHTS
ACT,
PROTECTING
MINORITY
VOTERS
(2006),
available at
http://www.votingrightsact.org. My point is only that means other than threat of violence and
armed conflict are more readily available and acceptable for redress.
83. See, e.g., Chan v. City of Troy, 559 N.W.2d 374, 376 (Mich. 1997) (declaring MICH.
COMP. LAws § 28.422(3)(b) (1996), which denied firearm permits to permanent residents,
unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution); State v.
Chumphol, 634 P.2d 451, 452 (Nev. 1981) (declaring NEv. REV. STAT. 202.360(2), a law
pertaining to aliens in possession of a concealed weapon unconstitutional as violative of equal
protection).
84. CRAMER, supra note 7, at 179 ("The strong nativist movement that played a part in the
KKK's resurgence in the 1920s appears to have also played a part in the passage of laws
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first few decades of the twentieth century, when fear of foreign anarchists
during the red-scare era, notions of immigrant mental deficiencies, and
stereotypes of immigrants' laziness and proclivity towards crime dominated
the popular and political consciousness. Although many of these laws have
since been amended or modified,86 the continued existence of some form of
alienage restriction in many states' lawss 7 suggests that legislatures still
believe that legitimate reasons exist for maintaining alienage distinctions.
The legislative history regarding these restrictions is sparse, but some states'
statutes still appear to be based on the danger to citizens posed by firearms
in the wrong (immigrant's) hands."" These state restrictions have persisted
even as the right to bear arms has unquestionably progressed beyond its
original limitation to "first-class" citizens,
Thus, historical context and progression suggest that gun possession is
not a political right, and therefore, that alienage restrictions would likely
fail. As I demonstrate below, however, this result does not necessarily square
with contemporary notions of what is "political," as developed in the case
law. Indeed, a closer comparison between gun possession and "political
functions" in current jurisprudence undermines the validity of categorical
"political" versus "non-political" labels and counsels for abandonment of the
political-function exception itself.
2.

Bearing Arms as a "Political Function"

Comparing the right to bear arms to the political functions the
Supreme Court has identified reveals that gun possession can be both
prohibiting resident aliens from possession of firearms."); RiCHARD

NEWBY, KILL Now, TALK
FOREVER: DEBATING SACCO AND VANZEYn (2001); RESTRICTING HANDGUNS, supranote 9, at 14-

19; Cottrol & Diamond, supranote 54, at 1334 (stating that the New York Sullivan Law of 1911,
which restricted the sale and carrying of firearms, was aimed at New York City where the "large
foreign born population was deemed susceptible ... and perhaps inclined to vice and crime");
see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 595-96 (1889) (describing the rising racial and cultural tensions
that led to the exclusion of Chinese).
85. See supra note 84; see, e.g., 1905 N.Y. LAWS, 130 ("No person not a citizen ... shall have
or carry firearms . . . in any public place at any time."); 1909 PA. LAWS 466 (prohibiting alien
firearm possession); 1922 MASS. AcTS 563 (prohibiting "an unnaturalized foreign born person"
from receiving a license).
86. See, e.g., 1909 PA. LAWS 466 (prohibiting non-citizens from killing wild game and
ownership or possession of shotgun or rifle) (later repealed); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S.
138, 143 (1914) (upholding Pennsylvania's ban on non-citizen game-hunting and shotgun or
rifle possession against equal-protection and treaty-based challenges).
87. See supra notes 11-14.
88. State v. Mendoza, 920 P.2d 357, 366-67 (Haw. 1996) (excerpting portions of Hawaii's
constitutional debate focusing on gun possession by the "illegally armed minority").
89. AMAR, supra note 48, at 47-49 (describing the right to bear arms at the founding as a
political right available only to first-class citizens); see 10 U.S.C. § 311 (2000) (including noncitizens with declared intent to naturalize and female citizens in the National Guard as part of
the current U.S. militia).
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political and non-political in character. But while its inherent nature is not
amenable to clean characterization,
the consequences of the
characterization remain rigid. As a non-political right, the government
cannot deny aliens the right to bear arms on equal terms, even though arms
use was historically, and is sometimes currently, used politically. On the
other hand, recognizing gun possession as a political function allows for the
maintenance of alienage restrictions, even though guns are now mostly
purchased for recreation and self-defense. 90
The Supreme Court's alienage jurisprudence in general, and the
political-function cases in particular, mark a protracted battle between
conservative and liberal Justices over the breadth of the term "political." 9'
Supreme Court decisions upholding state regulations as political functions
evince a trend towards a broader conception of the scope of activities
-v
onle
podn
e
potentially definable as political. Whereas Foley
v. Connelie upholding New
York's alienage restriction for state troopers, limited the exception to
activities affecting a state's ability to define its "political community," Ambach
v. Nonick, upholding New York's alienage restriction for public school
teachers, widened
that standard to include any "significant government
"9 3
.92

function.

As a comparison to gun possession, consider the four occupations or
activities that have been deemed to implicate the ability of a state to define
its political community or to constitute a significant government function:
police officers, public school teachers, probation officers, and jury
members.94 To differing degrees, each participates in exercising the coercive
power of the state over community members. All fulfill a state government's
role to its people in an area of traditional state concern. Police, probation
officers, and jury members share the characteristic of impacting community
members' personal liberty. The inclusion of public school teachers in this
group rests on the idea that they are role models who inculcate American
civic values. 95

90.

GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 25-26 (1991).
91. Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1047, 1113 (1994).
92. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 440-47 (1982) (allowing California to maintain
alienage distinctions for probation officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-80 (1978); see
Developments in the Law--ImmigrationPolicy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1286, 140506 (1983) [hereinafter Immigration Policy]; Harold Hungjo Koh, Equality with a Human Face:
JusticeBlackmun and the Equal Protectionof Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 78 (1985).
93. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76; Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 302 (1978).
94. See supranotes 42-46 and accompanying text.
95. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 78-79 ("Thus, through both the presentation of course materials
and the example he sets, a teacher has an opportunity to influence the attitudes of students
toward government, the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities. This influence is
crucial to the continued good health of a democracy." (citations omitted)).
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Gun possession by itself appears to share none of these qualities,
thereby validating its classification as a non-political activity. Yet, police
officers, and perhaps probation officers, are generally required to carry
96
firearms to assist with their enforcement of the state legislature's rules.
Aside from enforcement officers, the simple knowledge of the existence of
armed citizens is likely to alter the behavior of state officials, especially when
the state or citizen groups threaten to trample on guaranteed liberties. 97
Seen in this light, armed private citizens are the meta-enforcers of state
norms because they discipline those tasked with disciplining the polity.
Accordingly, gun possession must play some role in either reinforcing the
coercive power of the state and altering individual behavior in accordance
with that power or, alternatively, in disciplining the police power of the state.
Indeed, a closer examination of gun possession within and outside of the
official law-enforcement context reveals either that the political-function
exception must include general gun possession, that the exception should
be abandoned, or that it requires a case-by-case inquiry into the purpose of
gun possession before a determination can be made about whether it falls
under the political-function exception.
Armed citizens can and do utilize their right to bear arms consistent
with the original, political understanding of the right: to help maintain the
sovereign and geographic integrity of their state and nation. They do so
through state-sanctioned means, such as law enforcement, but they also do
so by guarding against governmental intrusions on liberty, disciplining law
enforcement into peace-maintenance action, and aiding law-enforcement
officials in effectuating policy. As an everyday reality, citizens who exercise
their right to bear arms outside of the sanctioned context of law
enforcement sometimes use their weapons as a method of extra-legal, extrapolitical enforcement of state-created legal norms. Before it was prohibited,
dueling between white males represented one form of alternative dispute
resolution for disagreements that the judicial system now handles.9a More
recently, armed citizens, such as the Michigan Militia, exercised their rights
to train with firearms for potential domestic disturbances.9 In the post-9/ 11
world, private civilian militia groups have once again gained notoriety as one

96. State-sponsored police forces with firearms were probably not contemplated at the
time of the founding, as the first professional, regulated state police forces took shape
fifty years after the Second Amendment was ratified. New York City's police department
took shape in the mid-1800s. See Mission Statement for New York City Police Museum,
http://www.nycpolicemuseum.org/html/museum-mission.html (last visitedJan. 31, 2007).
97. Williams, supra note 24, at 581. As an example, gun possession by civil-rights workers
encouraged state law-enforcement officials to increase vigilance and maintain peace during that
era. Id.
98. Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 54, at 1327-28.
99. See Welcome to MichiganMilitia.com, http://www.michiganmilitia.com (last visited
Jan. 16,2007).
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method of enforcing federal and state policy.'00 Groups such as the
Minutemen Civil Defense Corps have assigned themselves the responsibility
of acting as "force-multipliers to assist their monumental 10task of turning
back the tidal wave of people entering our country illegally." '
This call to protect the border involves the type of discretionary task
that is a fundamental component of political-function activities. In fact, the
Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus sent investigators to evaluate the
effectiveness of the Minuteman Project. °2 The investigators found that while
the official Border Patrol policy downplayed the effectiveness of the armed
citizenry, individual officers appreciated the valuable contribution made by
10 3
the Minuteman Project in decreasing unlawful immigration at the border.
Notably, a majority of the Minutemen wield firearms, and many are former
law-enforcement and military personnel accustomed to asserting the
discretionary, coercive power of the state. 104 Gun possession, as it turns out,
is not so cleanly definable as either political or non-political.
True, citizen groups such as the Minuteman Project and other civilian
militia groups comprise only a minute (some might say, fringe) segment of
the gun-owning population. Arguably, the fact that only a small fraction of
citizens use firearms in a political manner cannot transform the entire
activity into a political right that the state may restrict only to citizens.
Applying this same logic, however, not all public-school teachers are
inculcating civic values into students. Teachers who are citizens may not
share patriotic ideals about the United States, and a French teacher,
whether a citizen or not, may find no room in her class to discuss American
civic virtues.1 0 5 The Court's naked assumption that all public school teachers
exert the level of discretion that affects policy or sovereign functions is at
best an idealized fiction. 0 6 Ambach and Cabell stretched this fiction beyond
those with only a discretionary function by including occupations that had
symbolic value vis-t-vis the community.'0 7 Stretching the logic of the politicalfunction "exception" so far, as Justice Blackmun warned, threatens to

100. See LaraJakes Jordan, 'Minutemen' to PatrolArizona Border, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb.
21, 2005, availableat http://www.apfn.net/Messageboard/02-23-05/discussion.cg.67.html.
101. See Chris Simcox, Preface to Standard Operating Procedures for Minutemen Civil Defense
Corps, http://www.minutemanhq.com/hq/sop.php (last visitedJan. 16, 2007).
102. See FREDERICK A. PETERSON & JOHN E. STONE, RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
THE

MINUTEMAN

PROJECT,

FIELD

REPORT

TO

CONGRESSIONAL

IMMIGRATION

REFORM

CAUCUS
(2005),
available
at
http://www.minutemanhq.com/pdf files/norwood_
minuteman-report_-61705.pdf.
103. Id.at 14.
104. Id. at 6; see also Charlie LeDuff, Poised Against Incursions, a Man on the Border, Armed and
Philosophical, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2006, at A16 (describing armed citizens, many ex-military
personnel, who stand guard at the U.S.-Mexico border).
105. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 84 (1979) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 80.
107. ImmigrationPolicy, supra note 92, at 1405.

HeinOnline -- 92 Iowa L. Rev. 912 2006-2007

ALIENS WITH GUNS

swallow 0the
rule that alienage classifications are reviewed under strict
8
scrutiny.1

Moreover, the political-function exception is not only confronted with
this internal hydraulic push to expand, but also external pressures that
undermine the political exclusivity of citizenship. Non-citizens are excluded
from the political process only in the formalistic sense of exclusion from the
right to vote and hold public office. But aliens are not prevented from, and
often assert their political participation by, campaigning, contributing to
political causes and candidates,'9 engaging in public debate or protest, and
inculcating civic values into their children, who may be citizens and future
public officeholders, police officers, and teachers."1 LPRs and other nonexempted aliens must register for the Selective Service and are conscriptable
in the event of a draft."' The Supreme Court has described the act of
"contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation" as the
.supreme and noble duty" of the citizen."' If Congress can now entrust so
highly an esteemed "duty" and "obligation" of the citizen to LPRs, it is surely
incongruous to exclude willing and qualified aliens from internal lawenforcement positions. A police officer enforces state-created norms, but so
too does a soldier implement foreign affairs and military policy directly and
forcefully. In sum, every one of these activities in which aliens participate is a
discretionary activity that may often carry more political weight than the
right to vote, let alone the right to teach in a public school. Yet despite the
actual political import of the underlying activity, the labeling of it as political
or not determines the ability of a state to exclude entire classes of people
from important rights, benefits, and occupations.
Courts accept that alienage distinctions are sometimes justifiable under
the assumption that citizens as a class are more knowledgeable about state
and local laws, more assimilated to societal and political mores, and more
loyal to state and federal sovereigns.1 13 These assumptions fail to account for
the fact that aliens come to this country to secure rights and benefits not

108. Cabell v. Chavez-Solido, 454 U.S. 432, 458 (1982) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
109. Kostas A. Poulakidas, The Trojan Horse of the 21st Century: Immigrants, Foreign Campaign
Contributions, and International Politics, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 341, 342-43 (1998)
(chronicling the increasing phenomena of immigrant campaign contributions to influence
candidate views and policy outcomes). But note that under relevant portions of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, non-LPR aliens are prohibited from making contributions to
federal, state, or local campaigns. 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
110. Koh, supra note 92, at 94. But see Rosberg, supra note 2, at 304 (arguing that, because
many aliens come to the United States from countries that discourage active political
participation, they may have little affinity for non-voting activities that nevertheless affect the
political process).
111.
See 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (2000).
112. Arverv. United States (The Selective Draft Law Cases), 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918).
113. Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 136-38 (D. Md. 1974), affd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976)
(upholding alienage distinctions in jury service).
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available elsewhere and thus are likely to take them seriously.'" 4 Data on
criminal prosecutions reveals that non-citizen-offender rates are either
comparable or less than citizen-offender rates, with the majority of noncitizen offenses related to immigration offenses (for which their non-citizen
status uniquely handicaps them) or drug offenses. 115 Violent crime,
including crime with weapons use, is disproportionately lower among noncitizen offenders, and non-citizens exhibit lower recidivism rates. 1 6 In
addition, polls and surveys consistently indicate that native-born citizens
possess an appalling lack of knowledge about national and state politics and
law. 117 Finally, most LPRs have no intention of returning to their birth
countries, having adopted the United States as their new home. l Given
these facts, many of the concerns regarding knowledge, loyalty, or misuse
can easily be addressed by means that would ameliorate gun-possession
problems for citizens and non-citizens alike, such as loyalty affirmations,
civics instructions, or safety courses." 9 Otherwise, blanket distinctions in gun
laws are blatantly over- and under-inclusive with regard to the potential
political or significant government function served by gun possession.
These internal and external pressures cast doubt on the exact
parameters of political functions and require abandoning the politicalfunction exception altogether. Given the malleability of the activities
defined as political and the current utilization of firearms to fulfill
discretionary policy purposes, the analysis of the right to bear arms under
equal-protection review reveals deep ambivalence to the true nature of both

114. Koh, supra note 92, at 55; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Ruben G. Rumbaut, Terms
of Belonging: Are Models of Membership Self-Fulfilling Prophecies?, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 10-21
(1998) (reviewing empirical data regarding language and identity assimilation of immigrants in
America).
115.

BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: NONCITIZENS

IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 1984-1994, at 1 (1996); JAY CONUI ET AL., JUSTICE
DETAINED: THE EFFECTS OF DEPORTATION ON IMMIGRANT FAMILIES 6-9 (2004); John Hagen &
Alberto Palloni, Immigrationand Crime in the United States, in THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE 367, 37582 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonson eds., 1998).
116.

See supra note 115; see also Susan B. Sorenson & Katherine A. Vittes, Adolescents and

Firearms:A CaliforniaStatewide Survey, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 852, 854 (2004) ("All else being
equal, adolescents who were or whose parents were US citizens had substantially higher odds of
having a firearm in the home; the latter group also had higherodds of having their own gun.").
See RON HAYDUK & MICHELE WUCKER, MIGRATION POLICY INST., WORLD POLICY INST.,
117.
IMMIGRANT VOTING RIGHTS RECEIVE MORE ATTENTION (2004); Gregg Kruppa, New

U.S. Citizenship Test Will No Longer Be a Trivial Pursuit, DETROIT NEws, Feb. 13, 2006,
at
http://detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060213/POLITICS/
available
602130375/1024/POLITICS; National Constitutional Center, New Survey Shows Wide Gap
of Pop Culture,
Between Teens' Knowledge of Constitution and Knowledge
http://www.constitutioncenter.org/CitizenAction/CivicResearchResults/NCCTeens'Poll.shtml.
118.

See NAT'L PUB. RADIO, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV'T, SURVEY

ON IMMIGRATION IN AMERICA 5 (2004),
Immigration/summary.pdf.
119.
SeeDorf, supranote 29, at 315.

http://www.npr.org/news/specials/polls/2004/
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citizenship and gun possession. If the activity (e.g., public-school teaching or
firearm possession) is diverse enough to include people who exercise
political functions and those who do not, and we accept that in many
instances guns do aid in a sovereign or policy function (e.g., law
enforcement or active citizen militias), then equal-protection analysis of
alienage restrictions in gun laws cannot rely on a rigid and meaningless
notion of political.
To the extent that the political-function exception is not abandoned
and remains co-existent with alienage restrictions in gun law, courts should
inquire into the purpose of an individual's gun possession before
determining the constitutionality of the alienage restriction. Purposive
evaluation of every individual's gun possession may appear to be a farfetched idea, but it is one that has enjoyed some resonance in case law.12 0 A
comparative survey of state constitutional provisions reinforces the notion
that jurisdictions have considered the purpose of gun ownership when
protecting the right to bear arms. The constitutions of thirty states expressly
protect the right to bear arms for self-defense;1 21 eleven expressly protect
property or home defense;122 and seven expressly protect recreational gun
use for hunting or sporting purposes. 23 Four states individually enumerate
all four purposes of gun ownership-state defense, self-defense, property

120. In People v. Nakamura, for example, the Colorado Supreme Court in 1936 held the
state's alienage restriction unconstitutional on the grounds that it disarmed aliens completely,
without allowing exceptions for property protection or self-defense. People v. Nakamura, 62
P.2d 246, 247 (Colo. 1936). The dissent argued that the court should remand the case to
determine the purpose of the defendant's gun possession before overturning the indictment.
Id. at 247-48. Only if it was determined on further factual development that defendant's
possession was actually for self or property defense should the indictment be overturned. Id.
The court also opined that Colorado may restrict hunting or killing of game by aliens, a
position that would not withstand constitutional scrutiny today. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410,418-22 (1948).
More recently, the Oregon Supreme Court, interpreting the state constitution's rightto-bear-arms provision, concluded that it limits the legislature's gun-regulating power only when
the legislature infringes on the ability to defend self and property. State v. Hirsch, 114 P.3d
1104, 1112 (Or. 2005) (upholding state restrictions on possession by felons); see also OR. CONST.
art. 1, § 27 ("[T]he people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of themselves, and
the State, but the Military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power[].").
121. Those states are: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See
Eugene Volokh, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms as Providedfor in State Constitutions, in DAVID B.
KOPEL ET AL., SUPREME COURT GUN CASES: Two CENTURIES OF GUN RIGHTS REVEALED 29, 29-35
(2004) (citing a compilation of state constitutional provisions by Eugene Volokh).
122. Those states are: Colorado, Delaware, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, and West Virginia. Id,
123. Those states are: Delaware, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
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defense, and recreation-in their constitutions. 124 Perhaps most notably, a
proposal by Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists during the ratification debates
over the Bill of Rights included this specific language in lieu of the language
of the Second Amendment: "[T] he people have a right to bear arms for the
defence of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for the
purpose of killing game .... 25
These provisions and proposals demonstrate that governmental entities
are capable of defining and distinguishing between the four major functions
of gun ownership-state defense, self-defense, property defense, and
recreation. One of those functions-defense of state (and nation)-is
ultimately a political function in the sense that it is closely bound to the
ability of a sovereign entity to define its political boundaries. Thus, a noncitizen's right to bear arms may be restricted (subject to rationality review) if
that non-citizen intends those arms to serve those political functions, but
cannot be restricted (subject to strict scrutiny) if the purpose is self-defense,
property protection, or recreation. Indeed, many states that restrict general
or concealed firearm possession to non-citizens simultaneously maintain
exceptions for hunting or sport purposes.126 Ironically, this system would
penalize those non-citizens who, despite their legal status and inability to
vote, possess the civic-minded desire to contribute to the well-being of the
state.
In sum, the historical progression and contemporary jurisprudence
relevant to equal-protection analysis reveal considerable tension regarding
how firearms possession generally, and alien gun laws specifically, should be
characterized. Any understanding of the gun right as a political right
supports notions of gun rights as collective rights, as it would be intrinsically
tied to the definition of the state. Such a reading, however, may justify
increased state control over firearms outside of the citizenship context.
Thus, building a coherent understanding of political rights and functions
justifies alienage restrictions in gun laws only under a strong version of the
political-function exception that would then allow greater governmental
control over arms, even when not used in the political sense; conversely, this
same understanding justifies dismantling those alienage distinctions, but
only at the expense of undermining the existence of the political-function
exception altogether.

124.

Those states are: Delaware, Nebraska, North Dakota, and West Virginia. Id.

125.

THE DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION (1787), reprinted

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

in 2 THE
623-24 (Merrill Jensen

ed., 1976).
126. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 134-2(d), 134-3(a) (1993); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.01 (5),

265.20(4) (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2006).

HeinOnline -- 92 Iowa L. Rev. 916 2006-2007

ALIENS WITH GUNS
B.

GUN POSSESSIONAS A fUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

The tension between political or ideological commitments to greater or
lesser gun control and the problems posed by the legal mechanisms that
produce those outcomes would arise again if courts were to consider alien
gun possession under a fundamental-rights rubric. A blanket rule of strict
scrutiny for alienage restrictions in gun laws--despite the potential political
nature of gun usage-finds support in theories of the right to bear arms as a
natural or fundamental right of self-defense, bodily integrity, and resistance
to criminal conduct.127 If the right to bear arms is truly a fundamental right,
then it would justify searching review across the board for alienage
restrictions in gun laws.128 The Supreme Court, however, has suggested that
the right is not fundamental, upholding restrictions on weapons that do not
bear "some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia." 12 9 Nevertheless, historical persecution and contemporary
prejudice could necessitate reading the right as a fundamental right for
politically30 and physically vulnerable non-citizens, thereby requiring strict
1
scrutiny.
Civil-liberties activists have noted that firearms regulations have
"become dumping grounds for revenge against unpopular groups."131 In the
international context, it has been well documented that the Nazis used gun
control to weaken the political strength ofJews."' Similarly, on the domestic
front, overt and de facto racial restrictions on the right to bear arms during
the nineteenth century ensured that newly freed slaves would remain
defenseless against an armed, and often hostile, white populace."' Under
these circumstances, gun ownership was a virtual necessity for African
Americans to survive, defend property, and participate in the political

127. See Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST.
COMMENT. 87, 89 (1992); Salter & Kates, supra note 9, at 186-90. Liberties that are considered
critical and important to American democracy are deemed "fundamental rights" by the
Supreme Court and are subjected to strict scrutiny when those liberties are inequitably
distributed. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 10.1. Examples of such rights are voting and
access to courts. Id.
128. See, e.g.,
People v. Nakamura, 62 P.2d 246, 247 (Colo. 1936) (striking down alienage
restriction in gun laws because it deprived the alien of right to defend self and property).
129. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939); seealso United States v. Toner, 728
F.2d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Miller for the proposition that "the right to possess a gun is
clearly not a fundamental right").
130.
Cf Wishnie, supra note 30, at 725-28 (developing a theory of "extraordinary speech"
and arguing that immigrants' right to petition must be specifically protected).
131.
David T. Hardy & Kenneth L. Chotiner, The Potentialfor Civil Liberties Violations in the
Enforcement of Handgun Prohibition,in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS, supra note 9, at 208; cf Kevin R.

Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological Regulation in the
Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 833, 841-60
(1997) (cataloging historical link between domestic disturbances and harsh immigration laws).
132. Alonso, supranote 6, at 24-26.
133. Cottrol & Diamond, supranote 60, at 344-49.
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134

process.
After the turn of the century, as young blacks returned from
wielding arms for the United States in World War I, they found themselves
stripped of their firearms domestically when they attempted to fight for
equal rights at home. 13 5 Armed black men prosecuting war abroad were
innocuous, but armed black men agitating at home were dangerous.
Just as a culture of grotesque racial hierarchy informed by slavery served
as the basis for racially restrictive gun laws before and after the Civil War, the
pre- and post-World War I culture of nativism served as the basis for alienage
restrictions in gun laws appearing at the turn of the twentieth century. 136 In
the period from 1870 to 1934, handgun prohibition in general, and alien
possession laws in particular,1 3 7 dramatically increased due to popular
sentiments regarding immigrants' proclivity to laziness, inherent violence,
anarchy, and diminished mental capacity.1 38 Ironically, it was politically
secure citizen groups who imagined threats to their personhood, which then
led to alienage restrictions in gun laws. 139 The mid-twentieth century debates
over Hawaii's then-nascent constitution reveal this dynamic. In a 1996 case
attempting to decipher whether the state constitution protected an
individual or collective right, the Hawaii Supreme Court quoted extensively
from the Proceedings of the Hawaii Constitutional Convention of 1950,
specifically noting one representative's insistence that the government must
protect U.S.
citizens' right to bear arms against the "illegally armed
"
minori ty. 140

134. Id. at 345 (stating that possessing weapons "was vital as a means ... of preventing
virtual reenslavement of those formerly held in bondage"); see also AMAR, supra note 48, at 265
(noting political support in the North for African Americans' civil rights and need to own
guns).
135. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 60, at 353-55 (noting that gun-control statutes
aimed at disarming African Americans and discussing the grave consequences that occurred
when African Americans attempted to defend their rights by using guns).
136. See supranotes 84-89 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
138. See supranotes 84-89 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., State v. Mendoza, 920 P.2d 357, 366-67 (Haw. 1996); cf Cottrol & Diamond,
supra note 54, at 1329 (arguing that analytical construct of Arkansas' nineteenth-century gun
laws "mask[ed] concerns respecting the carrying of weapons by the state's black citizens").
140. Mendoza, 920 P.2d at 366-67 (quoting Committee of the Whole Rep. No. 5, in II
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII of 1950, at 14-15).
Representatives from the convention stated:
BRYAN: ... I think the reason that this is in here is because we don't want to see
the legislature pass a law absolutely prohibiting the use or the ownership of
firearms by the citizens. You'll find in history that it is the illegally armed minority
that actually we're faced with as far as the trouble is concerned. The legally armed
majority are the ones that should have the right to protect themselves and I believe
that this provision gives it to them ....

FUKUSHIMA: ... If we did not have such a section in, the legislature can very well
go ahead and discriminate non-citizens from citizens. This has been attempted
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Conversely, from the perspective of racial minorities, the possession of
guns by this non-virtuous citizenry-former slave masters, militia men
participating in Klan-related activity, law-enforcement personnel with racist
preconceptions, and other nativist forces-was exactly what necessitated
their own possession.14 In a perversion of Madison's famous expandingpolitical-sphere argument in The Federalist 10,142 this culture of mutually
reinforcing fear and violence required ever-increasing populations of gun
owners. As Professor David Williams notes, people who own guns for selfdefense do not associate their ownership with participation in an organized
setting, but rather with fear of others owning guns. 14 3 For racially distinct
communities, each group justified its own ownership rights by reference to
another group's ownership. 144
The obvious problem is that the political majority will always outgun the
politically vulnerable minorities in this arms race. This same cycle of citizen
paranoia and alien fear threatens to replicate itself with certain immigrant
groups today; the only difference is the substitution of the target ethnic
group. In one of the vignettes in Crash, the Oscar-winning film about multiethnic race relations in contemporary Los Angeles, a foreign-born MiddleEastern shopkeeper, after receiving repeated ethnic and xenophobic taunts
and threats, purchases a handgun to protect himself, his family, and his
store.14 5 When his store is subsequently looted and vandalized, he
misguidedly discharges his weapon in an attempt to exact revenge on a
blameless Mexican American locksmith. While the story is Hollywood
fiction, the sentiment and fear is not. 146 As Professors Led Volpp and
Muneer Ahmad detail, in post-9/11 America, Middle Eastern and South
many and many a time. In fact, in the last session of the legislature such a bill was
introduced and after it was called to their attention that perhaps it may be
unconstitutional, by the attorney general's office, then the bill was amended to
include all persons. I feel that all aliens, all persons, regardless of whether they're

citizens or aliens, should be entitled to bear arms if it is under a reasonable
restriction and if it's used for sportsmanship.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
141.
Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 60, at 357-58.
142. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
143. Williams, supra note 24, at 592. Consider also the popular bumper sticker that reads:
"If you outlaw guns, only outlaws will have them."
144. David Hemenway, SaraJ. Solnick & Deborah R. Azrael, Firearmsand Community Feelings
of Safety, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 121, 124-28 (1995) (noting that the majority of the
population-including gun owners-feel less safe when others acquire guns).
145. CRASH (Lions Gate Films 2005).
146. See Human Rights Watch, "We Are Not the Enemy"Hate Crimes Against Arabs, Muslims, and
Those Perceived to Be Arab or Muslim After September 11, 14 HUM. RTS. WATCH, No. 6 (G), 11-24
(2002); Thomas M. McDonnell, Targeting the Foreign Born by Race and Nationality: CounterProductive in the "War on Terrorism?," 16 PACE INT'L L. REv. 19, 30-32 (2004) (noting that 82,581
young Arab men dutifully obeyed a Department of Justice order to appear at immigration
offices, but none were charged with terrorism-related crimes).
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Asian Americans have been the victims of hundreds of hate crimes and
147
several violent deaths.
Notions of perceived foreignness, perceived alienage, and perceived
disloyalty148 underlie the distrust and racial profiling of "Arab-looking"
persons.
The recurring and wrong-headed attempts by armed citizens to
stop or deter terrorism on the domestic front could soon lead to those
149
"Arab-looking" immigrant groups arming themselves for self-preservation.
As studies of gun acquisition have noted, sales of firearms in the United
States increased after the 1993 World Trade Center attack and spiked again
after the 2001 attacks. 50 Since these weapons are likely not going to be taken
into foreign theatres of war by their purchasers, the idea seems to be that
they are necessary for national, state, and personal defense from domestic
terrorist threats. When kept domestically, terrorism-related xenophobia has
and will implicate gun use in identifiably racial, ethnic, and nationality-based
violence.'
Here, the political nature of the right to bear arms as evidenced by the
African American experience comes full circle. Gun possession protected
political rights for African Americans by ensuring the more fundamental
right of physical self-protection. Thus, committing to a strong right-to-beararms position based on self-defense principles is in tension with concomitant
beliefs that only citizens should possess guns. If self-defense and bodily
integrity have any valence as fundamental rights, then at a minimum the
means of securing the right to bear arms should not be unequally denied to
those who most require it. Hence, guaranteeing gun rights for vulnerable

147. Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of
Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1265-67 (2004); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist,49 UCLA
L. REV. 1575, 1580-82 (2002).
148. See Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 340
(2002); Volpp, supranote 147, at 1584.
149. For an example of perceptions of links between firearms, terrorism, and illegal
immigration, see the Guns Unified Nationally Endorsing Dignity website at http://gnned.com
(last visited Dec. 12, 2005) (linking illegal immigration to terrorism and encouraging armed
citizens to help deter the threat) (on file with the Iowa Law Review); see also Michigan Militia,
http://www.michiganmilitia.com (last visited Jan. 16, 2007) (same); John Perazzo, Illegal
Immigration & Terrorism, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=5147
(last visited April 6, 2007); The Threat of Terrorism Is from Illegal Aliens,
http://www.eagleforum.org/psr/2001/octO1/psroctOl.shtml (last visited April 6, 2007).
150.
Arie Bauer et al., A Comparison of Firearms-RelatedLegislation on Four Continents, 22 MED.
& L. 105, 110 (2003) (chronicling a thirty-percent increase after 1993 attacks); CATO INST., GUN
SALES JUMP AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 (2001), available at http://www.cato.org/dispatch/11-06Old.html.
Notably, not only terrorist attacks, but nature-created, human-intensified, domestic

crises such as Hurricane Katrina also appear to cause an increase in gun sales. Sasha Talcott,
Halted Gun Sales Infuriate Customers, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 11, 2005, at A19 (describing postKatrina handgun frenzy in Louisiana).

151.

See, e.g.,
Human Rights Watch, supranote 146; Volpp, supra note 147, at 1578.
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groups strikes close to the core of the Second Amendment's purpose and
historical progression. Originally intended as protection for the states from
oppressive central-government tyranny, and then arguably as individual
citizens' protection from state tyranny, the fundamental-rights reading
would now suggest that gun rights are essential to aliens' equal bodily
protection from citizen tyranny.
C.

THE INDIVIDUAL-RIGHT VIEW AND ALIENAGE RESTRICTIONS

Even if the right to bear arms is not fundamentally necessary to
vulnerable-group protection, non-citizens may be part of "the people" who
can assert the right under an individual-ight interpretation of the Second
Amendment. 152 Although not neatly covered by the equal-protection
doctrine, defining the parameters of "the people" in the Second
Amendment and the Constitution generally implicates ideals of
inclusiveness and equitable access to constitutional rights. One of the major
battles in legal scholarship and popular discourse rages over identifying the
boundaries of the right to bear arms, and specifically, whether the right to
bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment is individual or
collective. 113 To the extent the Amendment protects only a collective righti.e., a right inextricably tied to a state's ability to maintain a militia-gun
possession becomes a paradigmatic sovereign function at the heart of the
state's ability to define its political community. If, however, the Amendment
protects an individual right of possession for any purpose, 54 alienage
restrictions pose problems of inequitable treatment depending on the
breadth of the term "the people."

152. U.S. CONST. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."). The
individual-rights perspective posits that individuals retain the ability to enforce the Second
Amendment when governmental restrictions unreasonably obstruct an individual's gun
ownership or possession. Under this view, the first clause of the Amendment (the preamble or
justification clause) helps elucidate the need for the right, but it does not absolutely constrain
the right in any specific manner. See Volokh, supra note 24, at 807 ("I believe the justification
clause may aid construction of the operative clause but may not trump the meaning of the
operative clause . . . ."). The Second Amendment's second clause (the operative clause) then,
could be read much like the First Amendment's speech clause: a robust, individually
enforceable right that only tolerates limited and necessary restrictions. The First Amendment
does not absolutely protect defamation, false advertising, fighting words, or obscenity; nor does
it allow for shouting "fire" in a public theater.
153. See Dorf, supranote 29; supranote 24; see also Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under
Fire: The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY LJ. 1139, 1204-24 (1996); Glenn
Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States' Rights: A Thought Experiment,
36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1737, 1737-39 (1995).
154. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General, Whether
available at
Right
(2004),
Individual
Secures an
Amendment
the Second
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/secondamendment2.htm (arguing that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to bear arms).
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Under an individual-rights view, the only meaningful restraint in the
text would be the class of individuals who could enforce the right. The
Second Amendment, like the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments,
does not structure rights along a citizen/non-citizen dichotomy, instead
maintaining that rights of "the people" to keep and bear arms "shall not be
infringed." 55 Along with the Federal Constitution, seventeen state
constitutions also formulate the right to bear arms with reference to "the
people." 56 The remaining states frame the right as one retained by
"citizens" 57 or "persons.' 5 8 The alienage restrictions in state gun laws,
however, are only loosely connected with how the right is framed in the state
constitutions. Notably, of the eighteen constitutions that limit the right to

"citizens," only nine states maintain actual statutory restrictions on
noncitien
gn
•
159
citizen gun possession.
Similarly, nine states that formulate the right as
one retained by "the people" maintain some form of alienage classification
in their gun laws.' 6 Of the remaining five states with gun laws conditioned
on citizenship, one frames the right as held by "persons," one uses the
terminology "all men," and three are states with no arms-related
constitutional provisions. 16 Thus, in the fifty-one constitutions in effect,
usage of the word "citizen" in a constitutional provision does not necessarily
correlate with an alienage distinction in practice. However, usage of either
"citizen" or "the people" does correlate with the most restrictive definitions
of the class to whom the right applies.
If "the people," like "citizens," represents the most limited formulation
of who may possess or carry weapons, the most obvious question is who
exactly are the people that can assert this individual right to bear arms?
Although never specifically considered in the context of the Second
Amendment, the question is a hotly debated one that most recently came
before the Supreme Court in a case addressing the Fourth Amendment's
6
guarantee that "the people" shall be secure from unreasonable searches. 1
155. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
156. Use of "the people": Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. For this note and infra notes 157-58, see Volokh, supra note 121.
157. Use of "citizen" or "every citizen": Alabama, Arizona, Alaska, Connecticut, Illinois,
Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. One state, Kentucky, formulates the
right as one held by "all men," a vestige of the state constitution of 1891.
158. Use of "person," "every person" or "persons": Colorado, Delaware, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and West Virginia. One state, North Dakota, frames the
right as one of "individuals."
159. See supra notes 11-14.
160. See supra notes 11-14.
161. See supranotes 11-14.
162. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 267 (1990) (ruling that the
Mexican citizen apprehended in Mexico at the behest of U.S. federal law-enforcement officials,
brought into the United States to be criminally tried in a U.S. court tinder U.S. law, and whose
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The Supreme Court, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, read this potentially
expansive language narrowly, declaring that "the people" of those
amendments refers to a class that "[is] part of a national community or
[has] otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community.'

63

It appears likely that the rights

entailed in the amendments inure to a class more inclusive than just loyal,
participatory citizens, even under the narrow reading in Verdugo-Urquidez. In
fact, before Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court already had ruled that noncitizens within the United States, including undocumented aliens, received
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment protections in criminal
proceedings and that LPRs receive First Amendment protecons.'
If "the people" does not refer to the binary citizen/non-citizen divide,
to what specific division does it refer? Although there is no definite answer
to the question, it would appear to include U.S. citizens and then some
portion of aliens, possibly both legal and undocumented, that has developed
these "sufficient connections." Here, many state alien gun regulations posit a
notable incongruity because they demarcate a hard citizen/non-citizen line
for arms bearing. But, according to the Supreme Court, the same rights that
extend to citizens must also extend to all non-citizens who can demonstrate
sufficient connection to the national community. At a minimum, this would
have to include LPRs who pay taxes, all aliens who register for selective
service, and depending on the prevailing version of consensual citizenship,
perhaps non-immigrant or undocumented aliens as well. In any case, while
the line of sufficient connection may survive scrutiny when drawn at nonimmigrant aliens, it may not survive when drawn brightly at non-citizenship.
After Verdugo-Urquidez, it is unclear exactly who the other non-citizens
are that benefit from these constitutional guarantees. Although the exact
contours of Second Amendment beneficiaries remain indeterminate, my
discussion illustrates that the individual-ights proponent who also endorses
alienage restrictions would have to be committed to a highly restrictive
reading of the Amendment's text-a reading at odds with the Court's most
constrained notion of "the people" and with equality ideals.

residence in Mexico was subsequently searched without a warrant, was not one of "the people"
protected by the Fourth Amendment); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people
to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated....").
163. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. But see Wishnie, supra note 30, at 681 & n.74
(cataloging legal scholarship and case law criticizing Verdugo-Urquidez).
164. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (declaring that noncitizens are covered by the Due Process Clause and must be accorded Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights); Bosniak, supra note 91, at 1061 nn.42-43 (citing cases in support).
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FEDERAL-POWER CHALLENGES TO ALIENAGE DISTINCTIONS IN GUN LAWS

Alienage restrictions, outside the context of naturalization and
admissions procedures, traverse an area of regulatory interest (e.g., welfare
and firearms) and also single out a class of persons (non-citizens).
Understood primarily as statutes affecting regulatory interests, courts may
engage in the analysis detailed in Part I using domestic legal norms related
to personhood. However, courts have sometimes chosen to assess alienage
restrictions by focusing on the statute's classification of "non-citizens" and
therefore have evaluated those laws under the structural framework of
federal power. Similar to the equal-protection context, the federal-power
framework fails to account for the realities of state and federal interaction,
foreign policy, and firearms, resulting in the disutility of the judicial metric.
More fundamentally, reliance on the locus of decision-making as the
methodology by which to determine non-citizens' rights reifies the
when acting in
unwarranted deference awarded to the federal •government
165
its role as gate-keeper of the national community.
Under the broad umbrella of federal power, courts can compare the
structural-power dilemmas in laws with alienage restrictions along three
dimensions: (1) preemption of state law by comparison to positive federal
law in the area of regulatory interest (e.g., state firearms law compared to
federal firearms law);166 (2) preemption of state law by comparison to
positive federal law in the area of immigration and non-citizens; or (3)
invalidation of state law by reference to a purportedly exclusive area of
165. Legomsky, supra note 24, at 307-10; Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the
Principle of Plenary CongressionalPower, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 275-77; Wu, supra note 25, at 42,
47-48.
166. Based on the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the preemption doctrine
requires that even when a state law is enacted within an acknowledged state power, it must
yield if it "interferes with or is contrary to federal law." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2
("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land ... ."); Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (explaining the
preemption doctrine's basis in the Supremacy Clause). But see Gardbaum, supra note 20, at 81314 (arguing that preemption is not based on the Supremacy Clause and that recognizing the
disconnect will have significant implications for preemption law).
In general, courts divide preemption into express preemption, which occurs when a
statute on its face expresses congressional intent to preempt vel non, and implied preemption,
which occurs when Congress is silent as to preemptive scope. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98. Preemption
has three recognized varieties: conflict, obstacle, and field. Id. Conflict preemption occurs when
dual compliance is a physical impossibility; obstacle or "impeding federal purpose" preemption
occurs when state regulations frustrate achievement of federal purposes and objectives; field
preemption occurs when the existing federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive or the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal scheme is presumed to occupy the area and preclude
state regulation. See, e.g., id.; Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-42
(1963); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 62-69 (1941); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 5.2, at 378 ("Although these types of
preemption are presented as distinct categories, in practice they often overlap."); Jack
Goldsmith, Statutory ForeignAffairs Preemption,2000 Sup. CT. REV. 175, 205-06.
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federal power over foreign affairs and non-citizens, even in the absence of
positive federal law. 16 The Foreign Commerce, Treaty, and Naturalization
Clauses of the Constitution presumptively create federal exclusivity in
foreign affairs and immigration.'6
Although these three ways in which federal power impacts alienage
restrictions require different substantive analyses, all share two common
features that justify consideration under the same rubric. First, all three
require a court to decide that a statute that bridges regulatory interests, noncitizens, and potential foreign-policy consequences is primarily or
quintessentially about one of those areas. Second, all three require courts to
separate matters that are "foreign" from those that are "local" for purposes
of determining which level of government is uniquely competent to legislate
in the area. Both of these quandaries defy sensible and predictable judicial
decision-making. Moreover, any choice a court makes with regard to either
question demonstrates commitment to one set of constitutional values to the
exclusion of other, important constitutional values. As this Article argues,
however, there is no persuasive justification for understanding alienage
restrictions as immigration or foreign-affairs related, especially in the
context of firearms law.
On the federal side, choosing between domestic and foreign labels for
the statute creates a dispositive difference in the outcome of a case. If a
court deems a federal law, such as a federal alien gun law, a firearms law,
domestic legal norms would govern the alienage restriction-most notably
equal-protection norms-and would spawn the debates detailed in Part I.
Conversely, if a court characterizes the law as an immigration or foreignaffairs statute, it will instead leniently defer to the political branches'
Thus, the choice of the characterization-as either a
authority.'
domestically focused firearms law (hence, potentially strict equal-protection
scrutiny) or an immigration law (hence, deference to federal power)-is
outcome determinative for federal law.
On the state side, the question of which doctrine to apply-equal
protection or federal preemption-hinges on the characterization of the
statute, which can again be outcome determinative. Categorization of an
alien gun statute as a firearms law either leads to an application of equal167. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 3.5. Analytically, this type of federal-power analysis is
analogous to Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, in which state laws with substantial effects on
interstate commerce are invalidated even in the absence of contradictory or conflicting federal
law-making. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978).
168. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations .... ."); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("Congress shall have Power... [t]o establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . ."); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President shall] have Power,
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties .... ").
169. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (upholding gender distinction in a federal
immigration statute); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-81 (1976) (upholding alienage
distinction in federal welfare law).
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protection and/or a lax preemption inquiry. Indeed, the few state cases that
have upheld alienage restrictions in state firearms regulations have done so
by focusing on federal power and specifically assessing the interplay between
state gun prohibitions and federal gun prohibitions.' 7 These courts chose
not to treat alien gun laws as immigration laws. Doing so would generally
lead to bypassing equal-protection inquiry altogether and invalidating the
17 1
law as an intrusion on the exclusive federal immigration power.
Below, I first analyze state alien gun laws as firearms laws and then as
immigration or foreign-affairs laws, concluding that under either
formulation federal-power principles do not sufficiently account for the
descriptive reality of foreign affairs and firearms to justify their continued
use as a judicial metric. In the larger context of governmental regulation of
non-citizens, my discussion highlights the problems inherent in attempting
to classify laws as either regulating domestic affairs or foreign affairs, against
a backdrop of highly intermingled state and federal action with regard to
both domestic and national issues. With regard to foreign-affairs-based
preemption, I argue that the structural power components of the Second
Amendment provide a specific reason to abandon federal-preemption
analysis. As a by-product of this obfuscation between the domestic and
foreign spheres and continued reliance on a presumed federal power in the
area of immigration and foreign affairs, courts have been free to abandon
the general personhood norms, such as equal protection, 172 that should
apply when persons are denied rights or benefits.
A.

FEDERAL POVWR AND ALIEN GuN LAWS AS GuN LAws

Because state alien gun laws involve both domestic- and foreign-affairs
issues, preemption may occur via reference to either the federal firearms
schemes or federal foreign policy. When understood solely as gun laws,
courts assess these statutes against the federal firearms scheme. 7 3 While the
outcome in such an inquiry is likely non-preemption, my analysis reveals the

170. State v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d 677, 680-81 (Utah 1982); State v. Hernandez-Mercado, 879
P.2d 283, 288-89 (Wash. 1994).
171.
See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 418-19 (1948); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 65-69 (1941).
172. See Hernandez-Mercado,879 P.2d at 290-91. In Hernandez-Mercado,the court stated that:
The State claims that [the statute] is necessary to promote
public safety ....
The State's argument is weak, but so is
on equal protection of the laws. In any constitutional
presumed constitutional unless its unconstitutionality
reasonable doubt.

a compelling interest in
[petitioner's] argument
challenge a statute is
is proved beyond a

Id. at 290 (citations omitted); see also Vaci4 645 P.2d at 680 (responding to an equal-protection
claim by stating, "[tihis Court has previously held that the statute under which defendant was
convicted is a proper exercise of police power by the state").
173.
V/acil, 645 P.2d at 679.
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fallacy of dividing a statute into its constituent parts for purposes of federalpower analysis.
Congress specifically contemplated concurrent state firearm regulation
and therefore enacted a preemption or savings clause with the Gun Control
Act. 7 4 Section 927 of the federal criminal code provides in relevant part that
federal firearms regulation should not be construed as indicating a
congressional intent "to occupy the field" to the exclusion of state law
"unless there is a direct and positive conflict between [state and federal law]
so that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together." 75 In
effect, § 927 declares that only conflict-preemption,
and not field76
preemption, claims are viable for gun laws.'
Viewed solely as a firearms law, the savings clause appears to immunize
state gun laws with alienage classifications from preemption. Statutes and
opinions confirm that gun regulation is an area of joint federal and state
concern, but one that in the balance falls clearly within traditional state
police powers and will not lightly be tread upon by the federal commerce
power.'7 7 Outside the context of alienage classifications, generally applicable
state and local gun regulations have consistently survived preemption
7
attacks.

Within the aliens and guns context, federal law criminalizes possession
and transport by undocumented aliens, non-immigrant aliens, and those
who have renounced citizenship.' 79 State gun regulations tend to restrict
those categories and more.1s° Arguably, the federal legislation intended to
create increased state prohibitions.
A preemption problem would only
arise if states decreased restrictions and expanded gun rights to those
federally prohibited classes of non-citizens, placing the two statutes in direct
conflict.
The difficulty with this logic, however, is that it inevitably boils down to
whether Congress knew the precise scope of what it was attempting to

174. 18 U.S.C. § 927 (2000) ("Effect on State Law").
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text for an explanation of field and conflict
preemption.
177. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-63 (1995); Richmond Boro Gun Club, Inc. v.
New York, 896 F. Supp. 276, 282-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 97 F.3d 681, 689 (2d Cir. 1996); cf
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-25 (1997).
178. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1318 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding no
preemption of state tort claims by federal law); Richmond Boro Gun Club, 896 F. Supp. at 285-89

(rejecting a preemption claim against a New York City law that forbade certain assault weapons
within the city).
179. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(5), (d)(7), (g)(5), (g)( 7 ) (2000).

180.

See supra notes 11-14.

181.
See Oefinger v. Zimmerman, 601 F. Supp. 405, 409-10 (W.D. Pa. 1984), affd, 779 F.2d
43 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that the Gun Control Act intended to assist state firearm regulation
and encourage adoption of more stringent gun-control laws).
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preempt. To rephrase this as a question, did Congress intend or anticipate §
927 to apply specifically to more stringent alienage restrictions in state law?
Courts "often look to implicit evidence of congressional intent in
interpreting the scope of the preemption clause, or in ascertaining intended
preemptive scope beyond the preemption clause" when answering this
question.18

The preemption or savings clause in the federal firearms law reveals
general federal intent regarding state law, but it does not reveal much, if
anything, about Congress's intent regarding gun laws that have ancillary or
direct effects on immigration. Indeed, a survey of the legislative history of
the 1968 Gun Control Act and the 1993 Brady Bill amendments to the Act
reveals that Congress never specifically considered the topic of immigrant
Discussion
firearm possession in its appraisal of potential preemption.
regarding preemption focused on the extent of the regulation authorized by
the interstate-commerce power and how that power would interact with state
police powers. 1 4 While this evidence is not conclusive, it does tend to mute
the blanket applicability of § 927, especially when gun laws impact an
ostensibly exclusive area of federal power. At the very least, my analysis shows
that treating state gun statutes with both domestic and foreign implications
solely as issues of local regulation rests on an uneasy fiction about
congressional intent.
B. FEDERAL POWEuR AND AULEN GUN LAWS AS IMMIGRATIONLA ws
Courts could alternatively choose to understand laws that affect both a
local regulatory area (e.g., firearms) and non-citizens as foreign-affairs or
immigration statutes. Doing so necessitates conducting federal plenarypower analysis. Ultimately, this only exacerbates the problem of selecting the
proper legal doctrine with which to assess the statute's constitutionality
based on a distinction between foreign and domestic affairs. I conclude that
even against a plenary-power standard, the realities of federal and state
national-security regulation and firearms laws should disfavor the use of
federal power to invalidate these statutes. My conclusion allows for greater
state control in these areas, a result at odds with established notions of broad
deference to federal regulation in matters affecting non-citizens.

182. Goldsmith, supra note 166, at 206 (emphasis added).
183. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993);
A Bill to Providefor a Waiting PeriodBefore the Sale, Delivery, or Transferof a Handgun: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1991), microformed on
Cong. Info. Serv. No. 91-S521-20; HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Crime and CriminalJustice of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1991), microformed on CIS No. 91-H521-62; 1993 House
Hearings, 103d Cong. 239; Hearings on S.300, 552, 580, 674, 675,.678, 798, 824, 916, 917, 1007,
1094, 1194, 1333 and 2050 Before the S. Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Proceduresof the Comm. on
theJudiciary,90th Cong. (1967), microformed on CIS No. 90-S1833-1.
184. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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In the context of foreign affairs and immigration, the federal political
branches are often described as having plenary power. 18 5 That power largely
immunizes federal actions from judicial review and significantly impacts the
federalism balance.' 8 6 Courts will often find state laws that directly impact
immigration or foreign affairs preempted as a matter of field, obstacle, or
dormant preemption principles, even in the absence of federally enacted
positive law. 1 7 I leave discussion of the broad discretion afforded federal
alienage distinctions under the plenary-power doctrine for Part III.A.
1. Distinguishing "Foreign" and "National" from "Domestic" and "Local"
There are several significant, although ultimately unpersuasive, reasons
to believe that state alien gun laws should be preempted and invalidated as
entrenching upon federal immigration or foreign-affairs powers. Accepting
the following rationale for preemption showcases the stark disparity between
outcomes under domestic, as opposed to foreign-affairs, federal schemes.
First, because the Constitution expressly assigns power over naturalization to
Congress, l18 state laws that encourage or discourage either entry into the
United States or naturalization will likely be preempted.18 9 State laws
disincentivizing immigration are unremarkable in their unconstitutionality
because they demonstrate both a bare desire to discriminate and they
infringe on the core of federal primacy over immigration.' 90 The flip side of
the coin-providing incentives to naturalize (as opposed to discouraging
entry)-also fails as a justification for state alienage distinctions. 19 1 These
cases are fairly easy to resolve: both kinds of state laws eradicate any
meaningful ability to maintain uniformity over naturalization at the federal
level.' 92

185.

See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953).

186.

Compare Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1976) (upholding federal alienage

classification in welfare benefits), with Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-80 (1971)
(striking down state alienage classifications in welfare benefits); see also Chan Ping v. United
States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) ("For local interests the several
States of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign
nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.").
187. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text; see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 68-70 (1941) (stating that although it is possible to comply concurrently with federal
immigration regulations and state alien-registration requirements, the state statutes are
preempted by federal exclusive power in the field).
188. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
4.
189. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1977) (striking down a New York bar on
financial assistance in higher education to resident aliens).
190. Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores De Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 605 (1976) (invalidating
Puerto Rico's prohibition against non-citizens obtaining private civil-engineering licenses when

Puerto Rico proffered entry deterrence and naturalization incentives asjustifications).
191.

192.

See Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 11.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 11.
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Relatedly, the Supreme Court, in Traux, Takahashi, and Graham, held
that federal plenary power preempted state laws that so closely affected the
very existence and livelihood of non-citizens after lawful entry that they were
tantamount to denying entry. 193 These cases suggest any regulation of
firearms abridging non-citizens' livelihood runs afoul of federal prerogatives
to allow non-citizens residence and work opportunity. Under this rationale,94
occupations requiring gun possession could not be denied to aliens,
putting this analysis at odds with the political-function logic barring aliens
from positions that require firearms.
Second, federal power may preempt state firearms laws if those laws
create foreign-relations consequences. 9 5 Alexander Hamilton, in The
Federalist No. 80, warned of the possibility of state criminal sanctions
galvanizing negative international responses and recommended federal
solutions to such situations. 96 One could argue federal law preempts
alienage distinctions in state firearms regulation because foreign nations
may perceive them as a slight against their subjects thereby causing
international-relations problems. 97 This may especially hold true when the
non-citizens are religiously discrete and racially identifiable, in which case
state alienage restrictions in gun laws promote the perception that a foreign
nation's subjects cannot adequately defend their homes, families, or
themselves in •the
. 198face of an armed American citizenry with religious or
ethnic prejudices. Congress itself was sensitive to these potential foreign-

193. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378-80 (1971) (striking down state regulations
restricting welfare benefits to citizens); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 41819 (1948) (striking down a state regulation restricting the ability of non-citizens to obtain
commercial fishing licenses); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 40-42 (1915) (striking down state
regulation mandating private employers hire minimum percentages of natural-born citizens).
194. In some cases, this might require invalidating the entire provision, as with Kentucky's
ban on non-citizens working as firearms-safety instructors, or it might require invalidating the
alienage provisions to the extent they prevent earning a livelihood in occupations that
necessitate firearms. Examples of such occupations could involve police officers (subject to the
viability of the political-function exception), private security officers, and ranchers.
195. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (preempting an Oregon succession
law that denied rights to aliens from Eastern Bloc countries because of foreign-relations
concerns).
196. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 474-76 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)
("The States... are prohibited from doing a variety of things, some of which are incompatible
with the interests of the Union . . . [t]he peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the
disposal of the PART.").
197. Id.; see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-65 (1941) (noting national and
international consequences of individual state action); Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration
in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA.J. INT'L L. 121, 141-42 (1994) (arguing that in Hines, the
Court conflated treatment of aliens with the prospect of war).
198. See, e.g., Beyond 9/11, THE STATESMAN (Calcutta, India), Sept. 22, 2002, availableat 2002
WLNR 7602103 (discussing Indians' reactions to post-9/11 hate crimes and U.S. immigration
rules); cf Volpp, supra note 147, at 1591-95 (discussing and comparing attitudes toward
Japanese-Americans during World War II and attitudes toward Arab-Americans currently).
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relations consequences when it enacted selective-service provisions that
exempt certain "treaty aliens" from registration requirements to avoid
negative foreign-relations consequences with those nations.' 99 Federal
preemption seems justified in this circumstance because individual states
can export negative externalities to the nation or to other individual
states.2 °°
As recent reactions in and by Muslim nations to cartoon depictions of
the Islamic Prophet Mohammad in private Danish newspapers indicate,
some local actions can have severe international consequences, including
attribution of local or private enterprise action to an entire nation. 201 In
addition, the international reaction to the Guantanamo Bay detentions
demonstrates that foreign nations are vigilant towards American slights or
perceived slights to treatment of non-citizens. 202 The same is true when a
state executes a foreign national who hails from a nation that forbids the
death penalty. 2° 3 This heightened international vigilance is complemented

by increased American xenophobia and suspiciousness at home after
September 11.204 This increased prejudice is visibly directed towards Asian
economic interests, as well as all entities and people deemed "Arab," as
proven by Congress's reaction to last year's proposed Unocal buy-out by a
Chinese company and a more recent knee-jerk reaction to domestic port
control. 205 Because guns are such a volatile, and perhaps fundamentally

199. Roh & Upham, supra note 8, at 506 (noting political sensitivities that required
exempting so-called "treaty aliens" from compulsory U.S. military service).
200. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 435 (1819) (invalidating Maryland's tax on
the national bank); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1223, 1225
(1999) ("The rule has been functionally justified as eliminating serious externalities that will be
inherent in state foreign policymaking activity.").
201.
See Elif Thornafak, Hate Speech, TURKISH DAILY NEwS, Feb. 12, 2006, available at 2006
WLNR 2654294 ("The fact that various European newspapers reprinted the cartoons and
united to show their support for the Jyllands-Posten paper has strengthened the feeling
elsewhere that there is a 'European bloc against Islam.'"); Muslim Anger at Danish Cartoons,BBC
NEWS, Oct. 20, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4361260.stm. But see
Spiro, supra note 197, at 163 (arguing that foreign nations do not view individual states as
"coincident" with the United States).
202.
See Thomas Fuller & Brian Knowlton, Losing High Ground on Moral Leadership: U.S. Seen
Hurt by Iraq War, Detentions, and "Incredible Harm" of Prison Abuse, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 5,
2004, at 1.
203.
See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 662-64 (2005) (dismissing certiorari petition as
improvidently granted and discussing a Fifth Circuit opinion about Texas's pending execution
of Mexican national without notifying Mexican diplomatic authority); AMNESTY INT'L,
VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF FOREIGN NATIONALS UNDER SENTENCES OF DEATH (1998), available

at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=31&did=580.
204.
See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
205.
SeeAkram &Johnson, supra note 148, at 340 (noting and criticizing post 9/11 dragnet
response aimed at Arabs); America's Ports and Dubai: Trouble on the Waterfront, ECONOMIST, Feb.
25, 2006, at 33 (detailing the American public's reflexive xenophobia to announcement that
control of U.S. ports would be turned over to a company based in Dubai, United Arab
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necessary, 206 instrumentality, creating inequitable possession rights may very
well require factoring in the foreign-relations consequences of state alien
gun laws.
Finally, positive federal statutory oversight of non-citizens' arms use
arguably is pervasive enough to occupy the entire field. Federal firearms law
only prohibits undocumented aliens and nonimmigrant aliens from gun
ownership, possession, or transport. But, as noted above, by the express
terms of § 927, the non-preemptive effect of the federal prohibitions appears
settled. 20 7 Even so, because state restrictions on non-citizen possession span
two areas of regulation-firearms and treatment of aliens-non-preemption
of one lends no guidance on whether federal law also preempts the other.
Federal immigration law is quite detailed in its entry requirements for legal
208
These requirements
permanent residents and nonimmigrant aliens.
internal security.209
and
safety
include those intended to preserve domestic
More importantly, congressional action regarding alien military service
is nuanced, reflecting considered thought about the concept of armed noncitizens participating in the paradigmatic political activity of national
defense.2 1 0 First, Congress expressly recognized non-citizens by providing for
selective-service registration of all "male citizens of the United States, and
every other male person residing in the United States."211 Second, Congress
attached a benefit to registration and service for non-citizens by expediting
212
Conversely, federal
naturalization processes for compliant non-citizens.
a
by
or
serve
law places a burden on the failure to register
- 213 instituting
i.
permanent bar to citizenship for noncompliant non-citizens. This two-fold
carrot-and-stick approach evidences congressional intent to eliminate
middle ground and to tie the political act of defending the nation through
use of arms to achieving full membership in the political community. In
addition, in order to appease political concerns, federal law immunizes
nonimmigrant aliens and "treaty aliens," but also consciously does not
exempt some aliens even though principles of international comity might
214
have argued in favor of doing so. Taken together, these provisions reflect
measured thought regarding the non-citizens' armed participation in

Emirates); Volpp, supra note 147, at 1585 (discussing Richard Reid and Timothy McVeigh and

ineffectiveness of racial profiling against such potential terrorists).
206. See supraPart 1.B (regarding guns as a fundamental right of political minorities).
207. But see supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text (questioning whether 18 U.S.C. §
927 intends to preempt and supersede state laws regarding treatment of aliens).
208. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1182-1189 (2000).

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. § 1105.
See generally Roh & Upham, supranote 8.
50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (2000).
8 U.S.C. §§ 1439-1440.
Id. § 1426.

214.

Roh & Upham, supranote 8, at 502-06.
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national defense, even at the price of possible difficulties in certain foreign
relations. Arguably, combining Congress's limited prohibitions in federal
firearms law with its comprehensive military-service provisions indicates that
Congress may have intended to occupy the field of aliens and arms, thereby
justifying preemption of alien gun laws qua immigration laws.
Despite these reasons, the case against federal preemption of state alien
gun laws (i.e., upholding the laws)-even when those laws are characterized
as immigration or foreign-affairs laws-is more persuasive, in part because it
implicitly accounts for the inability to differentiate domestic legal norms
from foreign-affairs-related metrics. First, preemption would be premised on
a doctrinally weak basis. Second, the rationale of the potential foreignrelations consequences of state laws cannot easily be cabined. Third, current
case law and political realities demonstrate a blurring of the
federal/domestic divide in foreign affairs, marked by an increase in the
extent to which the federal and state governments both regulate issues that
affect foreign affairs. Finally, the Second Amendment's structural attributes
undermine a strong federal preemption position. When understood as an
anti-federal-power
check,
the Second
Amendment
provides
a
counterbalance against unbridled federal preemptive power over state laws
that have ancillary immigration and foreign-affairs consequences in the
firearms or national-security contexts.
The Supreme Court has indicated that simply because a government
regulation impacts non-citizens, courts should not reflexively deem the
regulation an immigration law.2' 5 But, for this premise to hold, immigration
power must•. be216construed to correspond snugly with conditions of entry and
naturalization. Outside of those specific areas, aliens should
be governed
• 217
by general constitutional norms, including equal protection.
To extend
the power over uniform naturalization to any regulation that involves noncitizens would be effectively to grant unbounded enforcement and lawmaking authority to Congress-a result at odds with the limits courts have
placed on other congressional powers in our system of enumerated federal

215.

De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976); see also Bosniak, supra note 91, at 1097

(arguing that Wong Wing stands for the proposition that the "mere fact that the object of

government power is an alien does not mean that the government is exercising its immigration
power").
216. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization .... ."); Rosberg, supra note 2, at 325 ("It is in the area of admission and
exclusion of aliens that the government's need for flexibility is greatest."); Wu, supra note 25, at
39 ("National sovereignty must be accepted. National sovereignty, however, establishes only that
the nation can regulate its borders.").
217. Chan v. City of Troy, 559 N.W.2d 374, 375-76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (striking down a
state alien gun law under equal-protection strict-scrutiny analysis); Bosniak, supra note 91, at
1058.
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218

powers.
According to this view, laws with effects on immigration should
only be preempted by an express federal legislative provision or an actual
conflict between federal and state law. This "minimalist" approach to the
federal foreign-affairs power, by focusing on express- and conflictpreemption principles, stands on firm originalist, doctrinal, and functional
foundations. Claims of a broad and exclusive plenary power, on the other
hand, stem from the very fact of sovereignty or functionalist reasoning with
little empirical foundation. 2 ' 9 Beyond the narrow range of legislation
described above, preemption becomes an exercise in judicial discovery of a
real or imagined congressional intent that Congress could have specified if it
wanted or had the political backing to do so.
Second, judicial focus on the foreign-relations consequences of state
regulation is always tricky because of its potentially expansive reach. It
requires that courts fix the meaning of "foreign relations" while the content
of foreign policy remains a moving target for the political branches. 22 The
strong version of the foreign-relations-consequences rationale was developed
chiefly during the Cold War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam Conflict.221
During those periods the Supreme Court and the political branches were
sensitive to the identifiable foreign-policy implications of state actions that
undermined the ability of the nation to speak as one voice about specific
conflicts and ideologies attached to particular nations. 222 In today's world of
domestic and home-grown threats, a nebulous war on terror, and dangerous
non-state actors, the same political considerations do not neatly apply. I do
not claim that our current situation requires less sensitivity to foreignrelations costs. However, national security and foreign affairs have become
simultaneously more locally focused and internationally diverse, ranging
from domestic wiretaps to military action or threatened military action in
areas across the globe and against groups with no national affiliations. These

218.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 552-58 (1995).
219.
See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 166, at 208 (arguing that courts should stop

considering foreign-relations consequences and should make preemption decisions "on the
narrowest possible ground, which ...is rarely broader than obstacle preemption of a particular
sort"); Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States
inForeign Affairs: The Original Understanding of
Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 368-69 (1999) (arguing that current

federal-preemption strategies lack a firm originalist foundation); cf Gardbaum, supra note 20,
at 771-73 (arguing that the Supremacy Clause only covers express and conflict preemption and
that beyond those parameters, preemption becomes an exercise of judicial discretion). But cf
Crosby v.

Nat'l Foreign Trade

Council, 530

U.S. 363,

373-74

(2000)

(preempting

Massachusetts' law imposing sanctions on Burma as an obstacle to objectives and purposes of
federal law).
220. Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism 83 VA. L. REV. 1617,
1621-22 (1997).

221.

See supra notes

222.

See, e.g.,
Spiro, supra note 200, at 1227-30.

219-20.
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conditions make it difficult to discern how or where the one voice of the
nations speaks today.
In addition, considering the foreign-policy consequences of every state
action leads to a line-drawing problem because courts cannot easily define
what consequences are significant enough to warrant preemption.
Scholarly literature identifies several instances of state and local regulations
that have or could have potentially caused international responses,
including local regulation of diplomatic parking, state tax schemes that
affected foreign corporations, and state execution of aliens.224 Preempting
every one of these situations would greatly erode local regulation and
undermine the general state police power. Moreover, it may not be advisable
for courts to investigate the concrete foreign-affairs consequences of state
laws, and any judicially created blanket rule regarding which consequences
would require preemption is equally unwise. 225 While a harsh alienage
restriction in a California gun law could cause significant international
reaction in countries as varied as Mexico and Iran, the same restriction in
North Dakota may not have the same international effect. To make sensible
rulings and standards, courts would have to undertake the investigatory
function of the political branches.
The actual international impact of state alien gun laws is difficult to
ascertain, especially given that many of these restrictions have survived for
decades without creating apparent international outcry. This difficulty
probably exists because firearms are not as widely available in other
countries that do not value private possession as we do in the United
States. 226 Therefore, because inequitable domestic-possession laws may not
offend the ethos of the foreign nation vis-A-vis firearms, it follows that they
may not raise foreign ire in the same manner as, for example, state tax
schemes or executions that contradict the legal or ethical norms of a foreign
nation.
A third and related reason federal laws should not preempt state alien
gun laws is that, as a practical matter, the federal versus domestic divide for
immigration and foreign-affairs regulation is becoming porous, a result that
may be both historically inevitable and normatively desirable. Professor
223.
224.

Spiro, supra note 197, at 156-57.
Id. at 167; Goldsmith, supra note 220, at 1620; Goldsmith, supra note 166, at 196-97

nn.91-95.
225. But see Spiro, supra note 200, at 1253 (disagreeing with Goldsmith and explaining
"Why Courts Have Done It Better"); cf Harold Hungjo Koh, Is International Law Really State
Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1847 (1998) (noting that "Zschernig has been appropriately

criticized for its failure to delineate clearly when a state's decision has such international
repercussions that it should be deemed specifically preempted").
226. See, e.g., Bauer et al., supra note 150, at 107 ("The acquisition of firearms by private
individuals is easier in the United States than other western democracies."); Doff, supra note 29,
at 330 (noting that no constitution written since the fall of communism contains right-to-beararms provisions).
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Spiro vividly argues that the "notion that the federal government now has or
will any time soon restore a monopoly over U.S. foreign relations is a fiction
to which only the fossilized striped-pants set can continue to cling."22 7 A
recent flourish of literature notes the increasing role of local and state
officials in foreign affairs and matters that touch on immigration.2 2 8 The
New York City Police Department's anti-terrorism measures overlap and
sometimes supersede the federal government's efforts. More importantly,
the NYPD's anti-terrorism unit often acts independently of its federal
counterparts, even on the internationally sensitive issues of national security
and foreign

events. 2 2

In Arizona and Texas, citizens and

local law

230

enforcement participate in federal-border-control efforts.
Most recently,
the State of California circumvented the White House and signed an
agreement with the United Kingdom to cooperate in combating global
warming. 2 1 These examples undermine reflexive suspicion of any state rule
inhibiting the •,•federal
government's flexibility in responding to changings3
23223
world conditions. Given congressional inertia, inter-agency squabbling,
and insufficient enforcement manpower,2M localities may very well be the
235
better responders to the domestic effects of international threats.
The Supreme Court, while still employing doctrines premised on rigid
foreign versus domestic distinctions, appears to have recognized the need
for some delegation of immigration-related matters to the states, at least in
areas of traditional, core state control. In De Canas v. Bica, the Court noted
that the federal immigration laws may make room for consistent state
regulation of undocumented alien employment, especially given that the
227. Spiro, supra note 197, at 162; see alsoGoldsmith, supranote 220, at 1622.
228. See, e.g., Michael M. Hethmon, The Chimera and the Cop: Local Enforcement of Federal
Immigration Law, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 83 (2005); Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, The Growing
Role for State & Local Law Enforcement in the Realm of Immigration Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
323 (2005); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1084 (2004).
229. William Finnegan, The Terrorism Beat: How Is the NYP.D. Defending the City, NEW
YORKER, July 25, 2005, at 58.

230. Peter Yoxall, Comment, The Minuteman Project, Gone in a Minute or Here to Stay? The
Origin, History and Futureof Citizen Activism on the United States-Mexico Border, 37 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REV. 517, 532-34 (2006).
231. Associated Press, UK. CaliforniaStrike Global Warming Deal, USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 2006,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-07-31-global-warmingx.htm
(noting that California is the twelfth largest producer of greenhouse gases, ranking it higher
than most nations).
232. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
233. See, e.g., Bob Drogin, Eric Lichtblau & Greg Kirkorian, CIA, FBI Disagree on Urgency of
Aug. 27 Cable Warning of TerroristsEntering U.S., L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001.
234. See PETERSON & STONE, supra note 102, at 22 (detailing manpower deficit); Port and
Maritime Security Strategy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportationof
the H. Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 107th Cong. 22-85 (2001) (statement of
AdmiralJames M. Loy, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard).
235.
See Finnegan, supra note 229, at 58.
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core of state police power includes control over employment and labor
relations, wages, and working conditions.2 36 Like the labor and employment
field, gun regulation falls within traditional, core state public-safety and
criminal regulatory powers. 217
While overseeing this relatively recent devolution of power, the
Supreme Court has also facilitated the transformation of formerly statecontrolled, citizen-soldier groups into creatures of the federal
government. 38 The Court confirmed the hybrid nature of today's National
Guard, delineating its control by both state and federal sovereignties.2 3' 9 Both
of these related factors-erosion of the federal/domestic divide on security
issues and opportunity for concurrent state and federal regulation on
certain matters-bolster the case that the foreign versus domestic divide is
not hermetic and therefore militates against any analytic methods that
would treat them as such.
2.

The Second Amendment's Anti-Federal-Power Implications

While the factors proffered above independently undermine notions of
federal exclusivity with regard to alienage restrictions, in the specific area of
alien gun laws, the Second Amendment uniquely impacts the preemption
analysis in a way that other public welfare or general police power laws do
not. Although dormant foreign-affairs preemption and specific immigration
supremacy may override many areas of traditional state police power, those
federal doctrines are especially attenuated in the field of gun control
because the Second Amendment itself has federalism implications.24 °
Professor Michael Perry, in his appraisal of equal-protection law, argued that
it is difficult to justify high burdens for federal alienage classifications
"unless an exercise of discretion by the federal government in immigration
and naturalization matters implicates a particular constitutional provision or
doctrine that constrains federal power generally."2 4' The Second
Amendment provides that particular constitutional constraint on federal
power.
I rely on four indisputable conditions to support this contention, while
still recognizing the disagreement over individual versus collective rights
236. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1976) (ruling that California's law prohibiting
employment of aliens not entitled to lawful residence when doing so would negatively affect
lawful resident workers was not per se preempted by federal immigration law).
237. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-63 (1995).
238. See Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 334-35 (upholding the federal
government's deployment of the Minnesota National Guard to Central America for training
purposes).
239. Id. at 345-49.
240. David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99
MICH. L. REv. 588, 639-42 (2000); cf Reynolds & Kates, supranote 153, at 1762-64.
241.
Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection:A Conceptualizationand Appraisal 79 COLUM.
L. REv. 1023, 1062 (1979).
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interpretations of the Amendment. First, the Supreme Court, in 1886, ruled
in Presser v. Illinois that the Second Amendment is a limitation on
congressional, not state, power.24 2 Second, the most recent Court case

dealing with the Second Amendment cited Presserapprovingly.243 Third, at
least six circuit courts support Presser's holding that the Second Amendment
244
is a limitation only on federal legislation.
Finally, the Amendment has
45
2
remained an unincorporated right.

These conditions ensure that strong federal foreign-affairs power
coincides with an anti-federal-power check in the realm of firearms control
and state security concerns. 2 4 6 While the Second Amendment's federalpower check has not been used to invalidate federal legislation, 241 the
Amendment nevertheless persists, unmodified in the Constitution and
unaddressed by the Supreme Court.2 48 To the extent its continued existence
still means something, it must at least function as a structural warning
against unconstrained, even if unexercised, federal power--especially in
areas affecting domestic security and regulation of domestic conduct.
I concede that my proposal is odd in its apples-versus-oranges character.
The federal foreign-affairs power is not being bound by a contrary political
or structural concern in the foreign-affairs context; rather it is bound by an
express federal-power check in the seemingly unrelated domestic arena of
gun possession. I say seemingly because the opening clause of the Second
Amendment includes the word militia.24 9 And while the militia originally
referred to the defense organs of individual states, the Constitution's
"calling forth" provisions clearly provide a federal role for those state units,
most likely in the event of a large domestic insurrection or an international

242.

Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) ("[The Second Amendment] is a limitation

only upon the power of Congress and the National government and not upon that of the
States."). But see United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 221 n.13 (5th Cir. 2001) (questioning
Presser'svitality because it was a pre-incorporation case).
243.
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 182 n.3 (1938).
244. See Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 84 & n.22 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing case law in accord
from the First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits). But see Parker v. District of
Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the Second Amendment "flat out
guarantees an individual right 'to keep and bear Arms'"); Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227-60 (opining,
in dicta, that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to bear arms).
245. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 6.3, at 478-86.
246. Cf Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The
Constitution, in addition to delegating certain enumerated powers to Congress, places whole
areas outside the reach of Congress' regulatory authority . . . . The Second Amendment
similarly [to the First] appears to contain an express limitation on the Government's
authority.").
247. See, e.g., Miller, 307 U.S. at 177, 183 (upholding the National Firearms Act against
Second Amendment challenge); Yassky, supranote 48, at 589 n.2.
248. But see KOPEL ET AL., supra note 121 (arguing that the Court has addressed the Second
Amendment in many cases, even if the issues did not directly involve firearms regulations).
249. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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war.2 50 The Constitution also gives Congress the responsibility of prescribing
"the discipline" for the state militia. 25 ' These clauses suggest that
the
Framers duly considered the link between firearms, federal power, and
limitations on that power. This link between firearms and federal affairs
creates a closer, apples-to-apples comparison between the federal foreignaffairs power and the anti-federal-power check found by courts in the
Second Amendment.
Other examples of resolutions of conflicting constitutional values may
provide some assistance in evaluating a "limited federal power" reading of
the amendment. In the out-of-state wine cases from the Supreme Court's
2005 term, unexercised federal commerce power, which nevertheless
proscribed state regulation of interstate commerce, was juxtaposed with a
claim of particularized, express state control by virtue of the Twenty-First
Amendment. 252 Although the five-Justice majority did not read the two
constitutional provisions to conflict directly, the four dissenting Justices
posited exactly that, concluding that in such a conflict the particularized
constitutional carve-out for liquor immunized state laws that discriminated
against out-of-state interests.25 By virtue of express delineation, the
Constitution appears to place firearms, like alcohol, in a special category
immune from extensive federal regulation. The analogy to the wine cases is
ultimately imperfect, because unlike the Twenty-First Amendment, which
carves out an express area of state control over a particular commercial
good, 254 the Second Amendment does not expressly carve out an area of
state control. Reading it as such would require a collective-rights
interpretation-a reading that is bitterly contested. 255
A more fitting analogy is the interplay between the federal treaty power
and customary international law, on the one hand, and their potential
256
conflict with federalism limits on federal power, on the other.
As some

250. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
251. Id. art. I,§ 8.
252. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 484-86 (2005) (striking down Michigan's alcohol
regulation scheme that treated out-of-state wineries differently than in-state wineries for
purposes of direct sale to in-state consumers).
253. Id. at 494 (Stevens, J., with O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("But ever since the adoption of
the Eighteenth Amendment and the Twenty-First Amendment, our Constitution has placed
commerce in alcoholic beverages in a special category."); id. at 497-527 (Thomas, J., with
Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens,J., and O'ConnorJ., dissenting) ("As this Court explained .... the text
and history of the Twenty-first Amendment demonstrate that it displaces liquor's negative
Commerce Clause immunity, not other constitutional provisions." (citations omitted)).
254. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing the Eighteenth Amendment's national ban on
alcohol sale and distribution and stating that "It]he transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited").
255. See supranotes 24, 129, 153.
256.
See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 816, 861-70 (1997).
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have argued, dormant federal foreign-affairs power could make treaties and
customary international law preemptive and binding on states, even when
those international legal forms touch on areas of core state concern that the
federal government may not be able to reach using domestic lawmaking
powers, such as the Commerce Clause.2 57 Regardless of whether those
scholars are correct, the United States has recently begun to ratify
multinational treaties that include reservations appended by the United
25"
States that clarify that the treaty will not alter the federalism balance.. Such
reservations suggest that the political branches view implied limitations on
federal power, embodied in specific provisions like the Commerce Clause, as
prudential constraints on their broad federal foreign-affairs power. Similarly,
the Second Amendment operates to provide a specific limit on the
preemptive potential of federal foreign-affairs and immigration power.
My goal in elucidating the arguments for and against preemption is to
showcase the dynamism underlying questions of what is foreign and
domestic, as well as to undermine justifications for the use of those
categories to determine the rights of persons within the national polity. In
addition, this dichotomy between national and local promotes the fiction
that the primary or quintessential nature of a statute implicating multiple
regulatory areas definitively can be determined. That fiction masks the
sensitive political questions and empirical accounts of federal and state
competency required of a nuanced understanding of foreign and domestic
affairs. Most important, a robust federal-power analysis also runs counter to
the general constitutional narrative of the twentieth century by permitting
courts to avoid the vindication of personhood norms in an area affecting
discrete classes of persons.
III. GUNS AND ALIENS-EQUAL PROTECTION OR/AND FEDERAL POWER
This Article has maintained that courts assess state and federal alienage
restrictions in general, and alien gun laws in particular, by unpredictably
parsing statutes that affect domestic regulatory areas and non-citizens in
order to determine whether to use an equal-protection or a federal-power
analysis to decide the statute's constitutionality. 2 9 As an example of this
257. Id. at 861-63. But see generally Koh, supra note 225 (disputing Bradley's and
Goldsmith's account of customary international law).
258.

U.S. DEP'T

OF STATE,

MEMORANDUM

SUMMARIZING U.S.

VIEWS AND

PRAcTICE IN

ADDRESSING FEDERALISM ISSUES IN TREATIES (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/

38637.htm (summarizing federalism provisions in U.S. treaties and international agreements).
259. As Professor Jack Goldsmith notes, during the Elian Gonzales saga in late 1999,
Florida courts were forced to decide whether state family law or federal immigration law would
apply when resolving Elian's custody. Goldsmith, supra note 166, at 175-76. Faced with a
conflict between a traditional area of exclusive state control (family law) and an area of
exclusive federal power (immigration and foreign affairs), the court determined the
"fundamental nature" of the case was immigration and preempted the state custody claim. Id.
(citing In re Lazaro Gonzalez, No. Civ. A 00-0074, 2000 WL 492102 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 13, 2000)
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classification system at work, consider Justice Blackmun's simple, strong,
directive wording in the first sentence of his evaluation of alienage
restrictions in a state welfare law in Graham v. Richardson: "These are welfare
cases. "' 60 From his initial choice, he then immediately focuses on an equalprotection analysis of alienage distinctions in state welfare law. Classifying
the case as immigration-related, however, would have required application
of a different set of legal norms that do not apply in the domestic-law
sphere. 261
Justice Blackmun's characterization of the law in Graham turned out to
be inconsequential. Because he also justifies his opinion on alternative
preemption grounds, he could just as easily have started the opinion with:
"These are immigration cases." This happy convergence between the welfare
and immigration classifications and the two corresponding doctrines,
however, is not always the case. One need only move to Graham's federal
cousin, Mathews v. Diaz, to see the tension at work. In Mathews, the Court
characterized an alienage distinction in federal welfare law as an
immigration case and proceeded to analyze it under the federal plenarypower doctrine, under which the Court declines to exercise much, if any,
judicial scrutiny.262
This framework is deficient because it does not adequately account for
the fluidity of domestic and foreign affairs or the important democratic
values represented by the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, it allows
governmental regulation of non-citizens to escape the manner in which the
Constitution otherwise binds governmental treatment of personhood. When
statutes bridge local regulatory affairs and non-citizens' interests, thereby
implicating divergent constitutional norms, courts have at least two options.
The first option-the one courts have opted to use-is to choose between
conflicting constitutional values and proceed with one mode of analysis. The
second option-the one I posit is a better decision-is to determine how
and Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1270 (2000)).
Elian's country of residence was at stake in the courts' decisions.
Professor Linda Bosniak's explication of the divide between "inside" immigration law
and "outside" immigration law alludes to this same dispositive framing problem: within "inside"
immigration law, aliens are at the mercy of the federal government's plenary power; within
"outside" immigration law, aliens are governed by generally applicable legal norms. Bosniak,
supra note 91, at 1058.
260. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 366 (1971). Professor Wishnie draws attention to
this language as well. Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration
Power,Equal Protection and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 569 (2001).
261. This was also the case in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948),
where the Court determined that California's prohibition of commercial fishing licenses to
non-citizens was an immigration law because it related too closely to the federal government's
power to allow entry and residence to immigrants. Because it was deemed an immigration law,
the Court (a) did not engage in a serious equal-protection analysis, and (b) invalidated the state
law as an intrusion on federal power. See id. at 416, 418-19.
262. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
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these conflicting values and doctrines work together at both the federal and
state levels to produce a cohesive analytical framework. Each option
represents a distinct vision of federalism, the nation's commitment to noncitizens' rights, and the meaning the polity accords to citizenship.
A.

EQUAL PROTECTION OR FEDERAL POWER

As with Justice Blackmun's characterization of the "welfare" statute in
Graham, there are many instances when a court's categorization of a statute
leads the court to apply one constitutional doctrine over another. But that
decision is inconsequential to the result. Multiple commentators and the
Supreme Court itself have noted that the Court's equal-protection alienage
jurisprudence is just as coherent as preemption cases, if not more so. 65 The
choice of which doctrine to use has little bearing on the outcome: statutes
that violate equal protection would be preempted; statutes valid under equal
protection would not be preempted. Alien gun laws, however, do not always
produce this symmetry of outcomes between equal protection and federalpower application. As equal-protection claims, alienage restrictions in state
gun laws are likely to fail under strict scrutiny.264 As preemption claims,
263.

SeeToll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 11 n.16 (1982); David Levi, Note, The Equal Treatment of

Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection?, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069, 1070-73 (1979); see also Karl
Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 939, 1014
(1995) ("The Equal Protection Clause is not indispensable to justify a rule prohibiting state
discrimination against aliens.").
For example, in cases involving state alienage restrictions outside of the politicalfunction exception, the Court would have reached the same result under either an equalprotection or federal-powers framework. See e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227-28 (1984);
Toll, 458 U.S. at 10-12, 17; Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601-06
(1976); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641-49 (1973); Graham, 403 U.S. at 374-76. As
equal-protection cases, the alienage classifications in welfare, civil service, education, and
employment all failed strict scrutiny. As preemption cases, state alienage classifications in those
areas would have been deemed attempts to regulate immigration directly or to regulate
activities so closely related to entry and abode as to make the state laws an incursion on federal
power. Similarly, in cases involving state alienage restrictions within the political-function
exception, the choice of doctrine makes little difference in the outcome. See, e.g., Cabell v.
Chavez-Solido, 454 U.S. 432, 442 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-81 (1979); Foley
v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 299-300 (1978).
Re-evaluating those cases under the preemption doctrine, the laws are valid, not
because of lower equal-protection scrutiny, but because exclusive federal power was up against
another sovereign's (a state's) self-defining power, in which the federal government is excluded
from interfering except in the most extreme circumstances. Cf Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 4647 (1849) (declining to decide which entity constituted the official governmental authority of
Rhode Island). This same is true for cases dealing with federal alienage distinctions. Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), dealing with a federal law, was expressly handled as a federal-powers
case. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), a case striking down a federal civil-service
law with alienage classifications, also fits this framework. Because the law was promulgated by an
administrative agency, the Court essentially treated the agency like a state for purposes of
federal preemption. Since the civil-service commission did not share the immigration power
with the federal political branches, its treatment of aliens was invalidated. Id. at 105-17.
264.

See supra Part I.
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however, alien gun restrictions are likely to survive despite exclusive federal
power over aliens. 26' This binarism creates outcome inconsistencies in two
critical situations: (1) federal alienage restrictions, and (2) state alienage
restrictions that would survive equal-protection analysis, but may
nevertheless be adjudged preempted.
Leaving aside the potential for asymmetrical results, the more
important problem presented by the potential for differing analyses is that
each methodology betrays fundamentally divergent understandings of noncitizens in the national polity and of federal and state competencies. On the
one hand, vindicating national-security and uniformity needs through
federal plenary-power analysis demonstrates commitment to a strong gatekeeping function for government. Under this rationale, federal power can
preempt state action both supportive and antagonistic to non-citizens'
rights.26 7 On the other hand, vindicating notions of America as a land of
immigrants and economic and social opportunity through the Equal
Protection Clause demands that the government commit to ideals of
acculturation and inclusion. Under this rationale, federal and state
governments should abide by the same standards of equal personhood, with
the exception of the federal creation of national rules and procedures for
admission and naturalization into the national community.

265. See supra Part II.
266. In the state alien gun-law context, this latter situation arises if one considers gun
possession to be political in nature and/or maintains a restrictive notion of "the people" and,
simultaneously, believes that alien gun laws strike too close to immigration issues to be left to
state control.
Notably, these two positions, which decouple at the doctrinal level, are conceptually
correlated: to the extent one believes gun possession is a political right, one will also likely
believe that immigrants should not enter the country with the automatic ability to possess one
and that eventual non-citizen possession should be contingent on proving loyalty or
commitment to the political community.
Alternatively, the disconnect in state law also arises if one accepts that the
consequence of Amar's theory of incorporation allows the limitation of arms-bearing to citizens,
thereby avoiding equal-protection scrutiny, but remaining potentially problematic with regard
to the federal foreign-affairs power. See supra Part I.A.1 for an explanation of how Amar's
theory of "refined incorporation," by emphasizing the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, allows for the limitation of certain rights to citizens.
267. Evangeline G. Abriel, Rethinking Preemptionfor Purposes of Aliens and Public Benefits, 42
UCLA L. REV. 1597, 1625-30 (1995). On this point, consider the preemption of California's
Proposition 187, which denied welfare and educational benefits to non-citizens. See 1994 Cal.
Legis. Serv., Prop. 187 (Westlaw 1994). In the aftermath of that preemption, however, federal
welfare law devolved welfare decision-making power to states, permitting alienage restrictions
with regard to welfare benefits. See Wishnie, supra note 260 at 493-97. In 2001, California
enacted a law providing in-state college tuition benefits to anyone-citizen or undocumented
alien-having attended high school in the state for three years. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5
(Deering 2002). That law is now facing federal preemption challenges in state court. Martinez
v. Regents, No. CV 05-2064 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2006) (order denying preemption
challenge).
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The scholarly literature appears to provide three ways of approaching
this vacillation between equality
structural power norms. First,
,,1
• ideals• and268
courts can treat states as "demi-sovereigns,
and abandon both doctrines
when state law impacts aliens. Second, courts can accept that the
characterization of alien gun laws-as either domestic, regulatory-related
(hence, equal protection) or alien-related (hence preemption)-will dictate
the outcome and develop effective criteria to determine which category they
should use. This method assumes that both doctrines are of commensurate
constitutional value and that the use of either one is a syllogistic by-product
of selecting the appropriate category for the legislation at issue. The third
way out of the dilemma is to select the normatively more appropriate
doctrine and apply it. Under this method, this Article argues that equal
protection is the more appropriate heuristic because classifying based on
alienage is a choice to treat a class of people uniquely and thus requires
personhood-focused methodologies.
1.

Abandoning Both Doctrines

The first solution to the problem of selecting between constitutional
doctrines is borrowed from Professor Spiro's provocative observation that
"states are ...

taking on some of the attributes of nationhood .... They are

modern demi-sovereigns. 2 6 9 Courts taking this approach avoid having to
classify alien gun laws as either equal-protection or preemption cases
because neither survives in a framework where federal exclusivity over
immigration has ceased to exist and states are permitted to regulate
immigration. Under this proposed regime, alienage classifications in state
law would no longer be alienage discrimination; rather they would be
permissible immigration regulation. 27 Thus, the devolution of immigration
power to states resolves the characterization problem by dismantling the
categories themselves-states can make alienage distinctions, so no equalprotection issues arise, and states can affect immigration, so no preemption
issues arise.
While this approach might resolve the need for binary selection, it is, to
say the least, a disproportionate solution to the problem, which leaves very
few guaranteed protections for politically voiceless, unpopular, and
vulnerable groups. 27, It solves the categorization problems, but it creates
larger problems inconsistent
with equal-protection guarantees and
272
constitutional commitments.
268. Spiro, supra note 197, at 163.
269. Id.
270. Linda Bosniak, Immigrants, Preemption and Equality, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 179, 184 (1994)
(responding to Professor Spiro).
271.
Id. at 189-90 (criticizing Professor Spiro's proposal for leaving aliens at the mercy of
the states).
272. Cf Wishnie, supra note 260, at 504-09.
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2.

Effective Selection Criteria

If courts instead attempt to make an informed choice between equalprotection and federal foreign-affairs power analyses, the difficulty lies in
developing a nuanced-in Goldsmith's terminology "fine-grained"-method
of selection that eschews the blunderbuss approach of choosing by reference
to either the general chapter of the state or federal code (e.g., "Firearms")273
or defaulting every statute using the word "alien" or "citizen" into the
federal-power category. In the state-law context, commentators have
suggested that courts can make the fine-grained choice either by examining
the purpose of the state law, 274 or by balancing state and federal interests to
determine if the state law only incidentally affects federal interests. 275
Although these suggestions sound workable, it is unclear how helpful
they are in practice, especially in the alien gun context. The xenophobic
origins of some state alien gun laws compel the conclusion that the primary
purposes of many laws are bare animus and immigration deterrence. This
presents an easy case for unconstitutionality under a purpose analysis,
regardless of whether a court relies upon the equal-protection or the
federal-power doctrine. However, when federal and state laws are enacted
with public safety, monitorability, and information-gathering rationales, the
high stakes of choosing the right doctrine manifest more clearly. 276
Traditional areas of sovereign state governance may weigh differently in the
federal-power and equal-protection analyses. Alternatively, a balancing
approach might help us determine whether federal power preempts a state
law by differentiating between incidental immigration effects and nationcompromising effects, but it could do so only through a series of nebulous
heuristics such as determining when "it is crucial that the nation speaks with
one voice. "277
Ultimately, those who have suggested purpose and interest-balancing
inquiries have also concluded that the best outcome is federal-foreign-affairs
minimalism, which requires positive federal law before state laws are
preempted. 278 While laudable, insistence on positive law as the solution to
273. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930 (2000).
274. Goldsmith, supranote 166, at 199.
275. Manheim, supra note 263, at 987-88.
276. See Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 87 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding a New York law denying
firearms licenses to an out-of-state resident against an Article IV Privileges and Immunities
challenge, and ruling that out-of-staters were the "peculiar source of evil" that the law meant to
address because they presented monitorability and local-control problems for authorities
(citing Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 526 (1978))).
277. Wang v. Matsaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1005 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 211 (1962), for the proposition that the field of foreign affairs requires that the "nation
speaks with one voice").
278. See supra note 219. See generally Ramsay, supra note 219 (arguing that courts should
uphold state statutes even if they affect foreign policy unless specifically prohibited by treaty,
statutes, or specific constitutional text).
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federal-power problems accounts for neither congressional inertia nor a
host of public choice and accountability problems that prevent clear
statutory federal statements. 2 9 Even if purpose or balancing inquiries were
effective heuristics for state laws, they do not shed light on what to do with
federal alienage distinctions. In the absence of positive law, and without
excessive investigation into hazy congressional intent, the ability of a court to
make a correct choice regarding which doctrine to use is highly suspect.
Despite these possible methods, choosing between the doctrines is still,
at best, an inexact science with dispositive consequences. Given this
imprecision, courts constrained to the binary choice between equal
protection or federal power should instead opt for predictability by
consistently applying the doctrine better suited to evaluating governmental
regulation of classes of people.
3.

The Normative Choice-Equal Protection

The third way out of the doctrinal-selection dilemma is to determine
which constitutional norm is weightier and always apply that one when
regulations implicate multiple constitutional doctrines. In cases involving
alienage classifications, preemption provides a coherent descriptive
foundation for the entire line of cases, but that does not necessarily make it
an equally appropriate assessment tool. Federal-power analysis has had the
pernicious effect of permitting the federal government to elude equalprotection norms.280 As Dean Harold Koh observes, choosing federal
foreign-affairs power over equal protection elevates a structural norm of
power sharing over a substantive norm of equal personhood. 281 Immunizing
the federal government from these personhood norms reduces the weight
and legitimacy of the equal-protection doctrine. 2 2 The Supreme Court,
when not presented with an overtly foreign-affairs issue, has recognized that
both federal
and state governments are equally bound by ideals of
2
equality. 83

279. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 225, at 1854 (describing the federal legislative process as
"notoriously dominated by committees, strong-willed individuals, collective-action problems,

and private rent-seeking"). Especially in the area of immigration and regulation of non-citizens,
federal legislators can shelter themselves from the political consequences of hardline stances, as
those most affected by those regulations-non-citizens--cannot vote. In addition, federal
legislators from states where a low number of immigrants arrive and settle need be less worried
about repercussions from naturalized, voting immigrants for their support of anti-immigrant
policies.
280. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-87 (1976); Immigration Policy, supra note 92, at
1418; Perry, supra note 241, at 1063-67.
281.
Koh, supra note 92, at 97.
282. Perry, supranote 241, at 1062.
283. Koh, supra note 92, at 95-96 n.224 (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638
n.2 (1975) ("This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always
been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment."));
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Conversely, equal protection is a more normatively appropriate
doctrine to apply when courts confront alien gun statutes (at least for LPRs
and nonimmigrant aliens) because it recognizes non-citizens' contributions
to American society and it sends a preferable symbolic message about an
egalitarian America.184 As the Supreme Court has noted repeatedly, aliens
pay taxes, serve on school boards and local governments, serve in the
military, are subject to all criminal laws, and must register for Selective
Service. 2 5 Equal-protection analysis helps soften some of the duplicity latent
in demanding these obligations but denying or limiting other protections
and benefits of the welfare state. 8 6
The current inseparability of international and domestic affairs
generally, and the potential structural implications of the Second
Amendment specifically, both favor even-handed application of the equalprotection norm to both state and federal governments. Federal preemption
was more urgent and meaningful before the era of globalization and
America's ascendancy as the world's sole military and economic
superpower.7 However, many current scholars recognize the blurring of
the line between foreign and domestic affairs. 2ss The Supreme Court itself
has recognized the need for some concurrent, non-conflicting state
regulation of aliens.2 8 9 This vitiates the need for separate equal-protection
standards for federal and state statutes.
The Second Amendment in particular alters the balance relied on by
the Court to dilute the equal-protection norm for federal legislation
impacting non-citizens-a balance it attempted to strike between equalprotection interests and immigration and foreign-affairs interests.2 When
one views the Amendment as a check on federal regulatory power, the
proper balance places the federal foreign-affairs interest on one side and
equal-protection norms plus a constitutional anti-federal check on the
other. 291 Using this scale, the federal government cannot avoid stringent
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) ("[I]t would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government [than it imposes on
states].").
284. Koh, supra note 92, at 73 (noting thatJustice Blackmun in Maudet portrayed aliens as
"valued contributors to American society"); see also Immigration Policy, supranote 92, at 1418.
285. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1979); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 4
(1977); see also Raskin, supra note 55, at 1460-65; see also Michael D. Patrick, Actions that
Jeopardize U.S. Citizenship, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1994, at 3.
286. Legomsky, supra note 72, at 288-89, 294.
287.
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436-40 (1968) (striking down an Oregon succession
law aimed at citizens of Eastern Bloc countries during the Cold War); Goldsmith, supra note
166, at 198.
288.
See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
289.
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,356-57 (1976).
290.
See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1978).
291.
I note again the potential orthogonal relationship between federal immigration power
and limits on federal firearms regulation. See supra Part II.B.
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scrutiny when creating alienage classifications for gun possession, even in
the post-9/11 world, where heightened national-security concerns are oftcited as justification for increasing federal power.292 Important nationalsecurity concerns were the underpinning of the strong, broad federal
foreign-affairs power through the Second World War and the Cold War, so
they have always been implicitly accounted for. Moreover, any unique post9/11 national-security concerns favoring increased federal power coincide
with the practical devolution of immigration and security enforcement to
local officials. Further, federal immigration law already bars admission of
aliens who are apparent criminal and security risks.2 9' Again, the balance
favors an undiluted equal-protection norm when the federal government
creates alienage distinctions unrelated to entry, exit, and naturalization.
The Supreme Court may have already silently recognized this erosion
and moved to greater scrutiny of federal restrictions under equal protection.
In De Canas, the Court evinced some recognition that non-conflicting state
regulatory power, in the absence of positive federal law, may be exercised in
the previously exclusive field of federal regulation over undocumented
aliens.194 The recognition in De Canas becomes even more significant when
considered in light of the progression from Fiallo v. Bel2 9 5 in 1977 to Nguyen
v. INS in 2001. 29 6 In both of those cases, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of gender classifications in federal immigration provisions
that gave entry and citizenship preferences to children born out of wedlock,
depending on whether the parent within the United States was the mother
297
or father. The critical difference between the two cases is that the Court
decided Fiallo exclusively by deferring to federal immigration power,
whereas the Court decided Nguyen by ruling that the government had met its
equal-protection burden. 298 The Nguyen Court, while citing Fiallo, expressly
declined to consider deference to federal foreign-affairs power. 2 99 Both the
choice in De Canas to permit non-conflicting state regulation and the choice
in Nguyen to employ equal-protection analysis are counter-intuitive. Given
the contentious equal-protection cases that the Court faced in the

292.

Cf OFFICE OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (2002),

available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat-strat-hlspdf"
293. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)-(3) (2000) (defining criminal and terrorism-related grounds
for classifying "inadmissible aliens").
294. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356-63 (upholding California regulations that prescribed the
conditions under which hiring of undocumented aliens was prohibited).
295. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
296. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60-61 (2001).
297. In both cases, if the biological mother was making the application, the preferences
applied, whereas fathers making the same application were not entitled to the same
presumptions. Id. at 56-59; Fiallo,430 U.S. at 788-92.
298. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 58-59; Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 791-92.
299. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 72-73.
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intervening twenty-four years 30 0 and the wide berth given to federal
immigration and foreign-affairs claims, the Court's unwillingness to
invalidate the law in De Canas and willingness to apply the heightenedscrutiny inquiry in Nguyen could signal a silent acceptance of the equalprotection standard at both the state and federal levels, as well as a curbing
of unconstrained federal power. "0 '
Courts that remain wedded to a strict doctrinal divide between federal
power and equal protection are required to make difficult and sometimes
unworkable decisions regarding the appropriate methodology they should
use when analyzing the constitutionality of a firearms statute with alienage
distinctions. In this binary system, the subtle movement of precedent and
the importance of the egalitarian ideal counsel courts consistently to apply
the "domestic" equal-protection norm to all problems-whether federal,
state, foreign, or domestic. But a more complete understanding of
governmental and judicial treatment of non-citizens requires reconciliation
of the divergent constitutional values undergirding each doctrine. This
rethinking is critical because it allows the polity to balance more accurately
the ideals of equality and disciplined government with the need to define a
sustainable political community. Alien gun laws provide us with an
opportunity to consider a comprehensive framework that avoids this
increasingly unpredictable divergence between foreign and domestic
constitutional principles.
B.

EQUAL PROTECTION WITH FEDERAL POWER (AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT)

Courts should analyze laws with alienage restrictions under a framework
that strips the talismanic power from the labels used within the judicial
doctrines discussed above and instead seek to reconcile the underlying
constitutional values that the doctrines represent. The doctrinal divisions
cause harm because selecting one doctrine inherently devalues the other:3
300. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (racial classification for law-school
admissions); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (exclusion of women); Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (sexual orientation); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978) (racial classification for medical-school admissions).
301.
I recognize that Fiallo and Nguyen dealt with federal gender discrimination as part of
the federal immigration power, whereas Mathews dealt with federal alienage discrimination as
part of the immigration powers. I cite these cases only as examples of the interplay between
federal powers and equal-protection scrutiny. See Michael A. Scaperlanda, Illusions of Liberty and
Equality: An "Alien's" View of Tiered Scrutiny, Ad Hoc Balancing, Governmental Power, and Judicial
Imperialism, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 5, 8 (2005) (noting that the Court considers invidiousness of
classification when it perceives Congress and the Executive need little or no flexibility); PeterJ.
Spiro, The Impossibility of Citizenship, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1492, 1498 & n.23 (2003) (book review)
(arguing that Nguyen signals the Court's chipping away at the plenary-power doctrine).
302. Rosberg, supra note 2, at 338 (arguing that the Court has declined to play a role when
immigration is "even remotely involved" and that such abdication "must be seen as an invitation
to Congress to act capriciously and without significant concern for the legitimate interests of
resident aliens").
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For example, the Supreme Court's framing of Mathews as an immigration
case meant that it applied an "astonishingly lenient" version of the rationalbasis test. ° 3 Conversely, alienage cases that strike down laws under an equalprotection analysis rarely, if ever, consider how immigration or foreign
affairs affects the decision-making process. As it turns out, Justice Blackmun
was wrong when he characterized Grahamas a welfare case; the reality is that
it was both a welfare case and an immigration case. °4
Simply because the normative balance favors equal protection does not
mean that important foreign-policy concerns cease to exist. They do; the
difficulty is determining how to account for them. Unless the Constitution
requires completely open borders with a free flow of people in and out of
the United States, federal officials should at a minimum be able to make
reasonable political determinations regarding standards for entry and
naturalization. Some alienage distinctions are not only permissible, they are
necessary-at least to the extent they inform Congress's power to create a
"uniform rule of naturalization."3 °5
The limited necessity of alienage classifications should alter the equalprotection analysis by enlarging the possible governmental interests that
could satisfy the first part of a strict-scrutiny inquiry. 306 National security,
gate-keeping, and the maintenance of a political community as justifications
would almost always pass muster as compelling governmental interests.
Simultaneously, my proposal would permit, and encourage, states to assert
previously "federal" gate-keeping justifications for their laws affecting noncitizens and would force the federal government to submit its laws to the
same judicial scrutiny as states when it creates alienage classifications. This
revised methodology provides a more meaningful analysis than the current
one, even when the results are the same under both, because it forces
concurrent consideration of structural-power principles and personhood
norms. A comprehensive framework recognizes that regulations may
implicate foreign affairs, domestic legal norms, state sovereignty, and
Second Amendment concerns of sovereign and personal security all at the
same time.

303.
304.
305.

Id. at 284.
See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Michael Perry illuminates this point:
Alienage is conventionally, if implicitly, regarded as a morally relevant status. Few
would take issue with the proposition that the members of a political community
may appropriately decide whether, to what extent, and under what conditions
persons who are not members may enter the territory of the political community
and share its resources and largesse.

Perry, supra note 241, at 1061.
306. Koh, supra note 92, at 102; Rosberg, supra note 2, at 325 ("It is in the area of admission
and exclusion of aliens that the government's need for flexibility is greatest.").
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Although the overarching goal of my project is to integrate these
necessary but divergent constitutional values, this Article's proposal grounds
the analysis of alienage distinctions in the equal-protection framework of
heightened scrutiny for four primary reasons. First, the framework
developed to address claims of inequitable governmental treatment of
persons or the uneven distribution of fundamental rights is appropriately
suited to assess a problem of separate treatment of alien persons with no
political voice. Second, unlike the federal-power analysis, the equalprotection methodology is pliable. Since its utility is ensuring the
appropriate fit between governmental goals and the means to achieve those
goals, the equal-protection analysis can account for the values and
justifications used in federal-power analysis. Third, as Dean Aleinikoff and
Professor Legomsky have noted, judicial treatment of aliens and
immigration has been marked by virtual abdication ofjudicial review, as well
as the judiciary's resistance to the constitutional changes of the twentieth
century. 3 7 Whereas the pure preemption and federal foreign-affairs-powers
doctrines allow virtually standardless congressional action and limited court
review of such action, 0 8 the tailoring requirement of equal protection
induces courts to interrogate the government's justifications and factual
basis before permitting uneven treatment of persons within the national
sovereignty. Finally, equal-protection methodology is necessary because the
tailoring prong of the analysis helps root out improper legislative motives,
such as racial animus, xenophobia, and other irrational prejudice. This is of
special concern here because both alienage classifications and firearms
restrictions have some legitimate bases and some improper ones. Applying
federal-power principles without testing them against ends-means scrutiny
dismisses legitimate motives, while masking improper ones. Ends-means
scrutiny implicitly disciplines both federal and state legislatures into
considering the fit between restrictions on non-citizens and the obligations
imposed upon them.

307.

T. Alexander Aleinikoff, FederalRegulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L

L. 862, 864, 869-71 (1989); see also id. at 870 (describing the courts' very limited role with
regards to immigration and arguing that instead of broad plenary power, "courts ought to
examine the justifications offered on behalf of federal regulations based on alienage to see if
they meet traditional constitutional standards of permissibility"); Legomsky, supra note 25, at
1616-19 (discussing the existence of and factors causing "immigration exceptionalism"); see also
Wu, supranote 25, at 47. Wu argues:
[T]he erosion of the entire surrounding terrain of constitutional theory leaves
little support for this last remaining piece of nineteenth-century racial case law. If
the other doctrines were rightly repudiated, so too the plenary power doctrine
should be "as application of constitutional principles to facts as they had not been
seen by the Court before."
Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992)).
308. Goldsmith, supra note 220, at 1698-1705; Koh, supra note 92, at 98; Wu, supranote 25,
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An ideal framework for analyzing alienage distinctions, then, accounts
for the gate-keeping and security concerns of federal-power analysis, but
brings treatment of aliens back into the "fold of modem constitutional
law. ',30q The incorporative framework I suggest assumes that laws and
regulations affecting non-citizens may sometimes be necessary and
important, but requires the government to engage in significant
consideration before it distributes rights and burdens along the line of
citizenship. This framework allows courts to recognize real differences
between state and federal competencies in the context of alienage
distinctions in federal law, as the federal government's foreign-affairs power
may create specific compelling interests regarding naturalization and may
override state prerogatives on politically sensitive topics. The tailoring part
of the analysis will likely lead Congress to produce the type of positive
federal legislation that preemption minimalists have been advocating.
Meanwhile, if the federal government has a compelling interest, courts will
respect Congress's prerogative as a co-equal branch and will vindicate
congressional intuition in creating the legislation.
This shift to a consideration of federal security and immigration
interests in the equal-protection analysis is less drastic than it may seem. The
Supreme Court may have already implicitly incorporated federal foreignpower concerns into the equal-protection analysis in its reasoning in
Nguyen.30 In that case, the federal government's important interest in
requiring proof of one's parentage to access certain immigration benefits,
and therefore entry to the country, satisfied the first prong of intermediate
equal-protection scrutiny. 311 To save the current federal firearms law, the
government would have to provide proof that the temporary nature of a
nonimmigrant alien's stay in the United States presents peculiar safety
problems to justify a blanket denial of possession rights to nonimmigrant
aliens.
309. Aleinikoff, supra note 307, at 870; Wu, supra note 25, at 42 ("There was a time when
immigration law was animated by nativist principles.").
310. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 53 (2001).
311.
Id.at 61-64.
312. Cf Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 88 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding New York's restriction on
licenses for out-of-state residents against an Article IV Privileges and Immunities challenge and
ruling that the state demonstrated that out-of-staters were the "peculiar source of evil" towards
which the restriction was aimed).
Subjecting the current federal firearms law that prohibits nonimmigrant aliens' gunpossession rights to both the binary and comprehensive framework demonstrates the value of
the latter approach. Under the binary framework, a court's broad deference to the distinction
in federal firearms law, if understood as an immigration law, would lead the court to uphold the
law. In its only other case addressing classifications that specifically bar nonimmigrant aliens
from obtaining in-state tuition, the Court invalidated a state law on federal foreign-affairs
preemption grounds. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982). Presumably, had Congress made that
same distinction, the Court would likely have upheld the law. This same reasoning seems
applicable to the federal firearms statute's restrictions on nonimmigrant-alien gun possession.
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On the state side, a comprehensive framework resolves the tension in
cases where the equal-protection and preemption analyses would yield
disparate results. States would not be able to use immigration-related
rationales to satisfy the compelling-interest prong:" ' State and local entities
could, however, assert domestic-security interests as compelling interests to
the extent that their local law-enforcement policies entail local enforcement
of national-security principles. For example, New York City, because of its
substantial involvement in anti-terrorism policy and comprehensive firearm
regulation, may be able to show a compelling interest (although it would still
have to satisfy the means-end prong). Perhaps more importantly, allowing
states to consider gate-keeping and security concerns would produce
legislation and judicial review that more accurately reflect the actual policy
goals of the state. As a by-product, the state's voting community would have a
greater understanding of the way its elected leaders have chosen to balance
the competing constitutional values at stake. Finally, reviewing state and
federal laws regarding alienage under the same basic framework encourages
a new brand of federalism for determining the place of non-citizens in the
national community. Under the framework proposed by this Article, federal
exclusivity and unchecked power would be curbed, while states'
consideration of gate-keeping necessities would increase, thereby producing
greater bargaining and cooperation between federal and state entities on
immigration and alienage issues.
On a doctrinal level, grounding the constitutional analysis in a basic
equal-protection framework that requires heightened scrutiny but also
recognizes that alienage distinctions are necessary in limited circumstances,
eliminates the schizophrenia of classifying aliens as a suspect class on some
occasions but not others. The model proposed here assumes that aliens are
always discrete and insular minorities for equal-protection purposes but
allows sovereign interests to satisfy the compelling-interest inquiry. It also
recognizes that, in limited circumstances, an alienage classification may be
narrowly tailored to satisfy that compelling interest. Thus, for state cases, the
comprehensive framework eliminates the necessity of a separate political-

In the incorporated framework this Article presents, however, the federal government

must present a compelling interest served by the denial of these rights to nonimmigrants.
Presumably, immigration interests such as ensuring peaceful residency before gun possession,
creating a durational record of compliance with U.S. criminal laws, and other informationgathering concerns could help make the case for a compelling government interest. And there
very well might be real differences between LPRs and nonimmigrant aliens that justify the
distinction. See Rosberg, supra note 2, at 277 (describing different categories into which
individuals may fall based on their reasons for being in the country). Even if the governmental

interests were deemed compelling, however, a court would still have to consider whether the
demarcation of all nonimmigrant aliens as a group is narrowly tailored to meet those ends.
313. See Rosberg, supra note 2, at 294 ("The existence of these special federal interests may
explain why the federal government can demonstrate a compelling need for a particular
classification even though a state could not.").
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function exception to strict scrutiny. Rather than rely on an all-or-nothing
process that involves debating the content of the malleable term "political,"
courts would assess whether states possess a compelling interest in, for
example, conditioning eligibility of their law-enforcement personnel,
probation officers, or teachers on citizenship. In the area of alien gun laws,
this framework may require governments to use more narrowly tailored
means such as loyalty oaths, residency requirements, or mandatory safety
courses.
At minimum, it would seem that restrictions on LPR gun
possession would have to be invalidated, bringing state law into line with
federal law.
The consistent recognition of LPRs and nonimmigrant aliens as discrete
and insular minorities deserving of treatment as a suspect class accords with
the idea that exclusion itself may be more important than the underlying
reasons for exclusion. Women comprise a numerical majority of our
1
country's population and have rights to participate in the political process, 15
but •.t-it is• still
to extend judicial protection to gender
316 appropriate
classifications.
Likewise, white citizens were never legally or historically
subordinated to another ethnic group, nor do they comprise a discrete and
insular minority, yet laws restricting whites' access to educational and work
opportunities are subject to review under strict scrutiny. 317 Therefore, simply
because good reasons exist for creating alienage classifications in limited
circumstances should not alone render the fact of exclusion immune from
strict scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
Rethinking constitutional doctrines in light of the realities of alienage,
foreign affairs, state and federal powers, and gun possession in America
requires the rejection of the false binarisms inherent in a political versus
non-political, foreign versus domestic, and equal-protection versus federalpower analytical mode. This Article aimed to expose and reconcile the
competing fundamental constitutional values at work in the nexus of
firearms and citizenship-an area that provides an illuminating view of the
larger debates surrounding individual rights, political rights, structural
314. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 462-63 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting loyalty oaths); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104(b) (2005) (instituting
residency requirements for citizens and LPRs); Doff, supra note 29, at 315, 342 (noting that the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 required loyalty oaths for firearms so that the state could
assess trustworthiness of those with guns); Gerald Rosberg, Discrimination Against the
"Nonresident"Alien,44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 399, 403-04 (1983).
315.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE
UNITED STATES: HIS AND HER DEMOGRAPHICS 67 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/

population/pop-profile/2000/profile2000.pdf.
316.
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
317.
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2002); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (upholding strict-scrutiny analysis for all racial classifications).
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powers, structural restrictions, personhood norms, and inclusion in our
national polity. I maintain that eroding the doctrinal walls that separate
equal-protection and federal-power principles produces an analysis more
mindful of the divergent values underlying the doctrines. More importantly,
the incorporative framework presented here brings us closer to a cohesive
understanding of non-citizens' place in our national community because it
compels courts and legislatures at both the state and federal levels to
reconcile the competing constitutional ideals at stake when they use
citizenship as the dividing line for rights and benefits.
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